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I. INTRODUCTION
Try this: in normal conversation with a friend or co-worker, relate all
your activities over the past two weeks without once giving any
indication of your marital or relationship status and without providing
any clues as to the sex of the persons with whom you shared these
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activities. Difficult?' Now imagine doing this with everyone you know
at work, at school, at the grocery store, at the dry cleaners, at the health
club, everyone-and not just describing the past two weeks, but all the
time-for every vacation, birthday, date, anniversary, and all the little
occasions and nonoccasions that make up your daily life.
Tiring, isn't it? This is part of the world of the closet' in which
lesbians and gay men' hide or deny their sexual orientation to others
1. This is not merely an academic exercise, as this quote from a gay attorney
surveyed in Los Angeles illustrates:
I have to sit anxiously in the office and, at every moment, try to figure out
whether and when I can say "we" and risk someone asking who "we" is....
[I]f someone asks, "What happened this weekend?" and I slip and [say] "we"
instead of "I," then I go through a kind of turmoil. That really requires energy
that.., prevents you ... from achieving any peace and assurance.
Committee on Sexual Orientation Bias, Report on Sexual Orientation Bias, 1994 L.A.
COUNTY BAR Ass'N 28 (quoting the response given by one gay attorney who was
surveyed) (alterations in original) [hereinafter L.A. Bar Report].
2. Commentators have explored the phenomenon of the closet extensively. E.g.,
EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1990). On one man's
experiences with the closet and his reasons for remaining there, see Robert Lipsyte, A
Major League Player's Life of Isolation and Secret Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6 1999, at
Al.
3. This Article uses "the terms 'lesbians' and 'gay men' when referring to women
and men whose sexual orientation is same-sex and gay when referring to same-sex
persons generally. By doing so, this Article illustrates that the experience of same-sex
orientation is often, but not exclusively mediated by gender." Todd Brower, "A Stranger
to Its Laws:" Homosexuality, Schemas, and the Lessons and Limits of Reasoning by
Analogy, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 65, 65 n.2 (1997) (citing Marc A. Fajer, Can Two
Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal
Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 535-36 (1992)). Race
also influences sexual orientation identity. E.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet
Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29
CONN. L. REV. 561, 562-66 (1997).
Although some commentators and segments of the gay community employ "queer,"
e.g., Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the
Conflation of "Sex, " "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and
Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 n.2, 347-49 (1995); Dan Levy, A New Generation,
Bending the Rules: Young Gays, Lesbians Shred the Old Labels, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 28,
1994, at A 1, and others have suggested that "homosexual," "gay," and "queer" have very
different connotations, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, Oscar Wilde: Paradoxical Poster Child
for Both Identity and Post-Identity, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 153, 156 (2000), this Article
does neither.
Studies have shown that it is probably more accurate to refer to "homosexualities," as
there is a diverse continuum of same-sex orientations. ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN S.
WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIEs: A STUDY OF DIVERSITY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN 53-61
(1978); ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 636-55
(1948); see also Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After
Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1723 (1993). Nevertheless, for simplicity,
this Article uses the singular. Finally, the author has avoided using "straight" to
characterize heterosexuals or heterosexuality, as that term implies that lesbians and gay
men are crooked or deviant. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2452
(2000) (discussing phrase "morally straight" within Boy Scout oath as excluding gay
people); see also Fajer, supra note 3, at 536 n. 119.
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rather than identify themselves as lesbian or gay.
The decision4 to acknowledge one's sexual orientation-to "come
out'5 in common parlance-exposes gay people to a variety of responses
from acceptance, to ridicule,6 to loss of contracts or other means to earn
a living, to termination of employment or other benefits.8 Nevertheless,
it is an essential step toward lesbian and gay persons' full and equal
participation in American society. Legal rules can help or hinder this
process; current doctrine, unfortunately, does both.
Coming out of the closet is only a metaphor. We literally step out of a
4. The "decision" is more correctly "decisions." Publicly acknowledging one's
sexual orientation is a series of continuing choices of how and how much to disclose.
See infra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
5. Although the term "come out" is primarily connected with self-identification
as lesbian or gay, the metaphor of coming out of the closet has been appropriated in a
wide variety of contexts. E.g., Arms Race? Make Mine a Musket, ROCKY MT. NEWs,
Feb. 8, 2000, at 6A, http://www.newslibrary.comdeliverppdoc.asp?SMG=572400
(discussing coming out as a gun owner); Kayce T. Ataiyero, Burdened No More, They're
Happily Fat, BOSTON GLOBE, July 29, 1999, at BI (discussing coming out as a fat
person); Kathryn Orth, "We Have to Begin by Being Better People." RICH. TIMES
DISPATCH, May 13, 2000, at C3 (discussing coming out as a Christian); David Whitley,
Miami-N.Y. Is So Ugly It's Pretty, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 21, 2000, at Cl,
http://archive.orlandosentinel.com@He0a949008ad092ea9l27cf~al fcda500:b-=v&tid=5
60 (discussing coming out as a N.Y. Knicks or Miami Heat fan). For a discussion of the
historical evolution of the term, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of
"Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality, ad Collisions of Liberty anti Equality in
American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2438-41 (1997).
6. Bettina Boxall & Duane Noriyuki, Abuse of Gay Students Brings Increase in
Lawsuits, L.A. Timms, May 28, 1999, at Al. Sometimes, even association with an
openly gay or lesbian person is cause for harassment. E.g., ERIC ANDERSO..
TRAILBLAZING: THE TRuE STORY OF AMERICA's FIRST OPENLY GAY TRACK COACH
(2000); Lee Ronney, Teen's Attack Investigated, L.A. TIMES, ORANGE CouNTY EDmo.,
June 13, 1996, at B 1 (discussing the harassment of a student athlete because the student's
coach disclosed his sexuality). Finally, some people take great pains to avoid even the
implication of association with lesbians or gay men. E.g., Fear of Gay Symbol Changed
School Logo, S.F. EXAMINER, July 28, 2000, at A9 (noting that University of Hawaii
changed seventy-seven-year-old rainbow symbol and team name, "Rainbow Warriors."
to avoid gay implications and stigma).
7. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1994) (discussing armed forces' "don't ask, don't tell"
policy); Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (1 Ith Cir. 1997).
8. Peter Hartlaub, Gay M.D. Sues Over Military Discharge, SUN-SENTL'EL (Fort
Lauderdale), May 22, 2000, at A9 (noting that the Air Force is suing to recover the
amount spent for medical school education for military doctor Who disclosed his
homosexuality); Bob Roehr, Navy Continues Harassment of Gays, BAY AREA- REP., May
25, 2000, at 13 (relating that the Navy is seeking to recoup cost of education at U.S.
Naval Academy from former student who resigned under threat of expulsion for being
gay); Christian College Bans Gay Alunni, S.F. EXAMIINER, OCL 23, 1998, at A14
(discussing that Bob Jones University bans gay alumni from campus and threatens them
with arrest for trespass).
closet into a room all at one time. One is either in one place or another,
in the closet or out. Unlike that literal decision to come out of the closet,
publicly acknowledging one's identity as lesbian or gay is a series of
continuing choices as to how and how much to disclose, and when and
to whom.9 Thus, one can be open about one's sexual orientation to
friends or family, but not at work, 0 or open to other lesbians or gay men,
but not to non-gay people." Alternatively, one may decide to answer a
direct question, but not volunteer information about sexual orientation.'"
Complicating these decisions is that if a lesbian or gay man remains
silent, other people assume that he or she is not gay." This assumption
allows some gay people to hide their identity and avoid the negative
consequences of being open. 4 Nevertheless, the closet is not a solution
to anti-gay discrimination; forced invisibility is a form of anti-gay
inequality.'" As the opening experiment illustrated, denying a part of
one's life is neither easy nor comfortable. Neither legal doctrine nor
societal pressures coerce non-gay persons into such denial.
Remaining silent causes some lesbians and gay men to feel they are
deceiving others. 6 The closet reinforces lesbian and gay marginalization
because it requires gay people to deny an essential difference between
them and non-gay persons.' 7 Some lesbians or gay men do not fit neatly
9. For several examples of coming out stories and the individual choices that
those gay persons made, see BoYs LIKE Us: GAY WRITERS TELL THEIR COMING OUT
STORIES (Patrick Merla ed., 1996).
10. Dave Cullen, A Heartbreaking Decision, SALON, at http://www.salon.com/
news/feature/2000/06/07/relationshipslprint.html (June 7, 2000) (describing Marine
captain who originally created a separate gay life in Denver, seventy miles away from
the "gay-free zone" of Colorado Springs where he was stationed); see also infra Part III.
II. See Eskridge, supra note 5, at 2439 (stating that by 1960, some lesbians or gay
men equated coming out with talking to non-gays about one's sexual orientation); id. at
2440 (noting coming out means talking to people who do not share one's sexual
orientation, not just those who do).
12. Debate Over Grade School Teacher Divulging He's Gay, S.F. EXAMINER, June
11, 2000, at A3.
13. Adrienne Rich calls this assumption and its consequences, "compulsory
heterosexuality." Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in
POWERS OF DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 177 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983).
14. Dominic J. Brewer & Maryann Jacobi Gray, Survey of Sexual Orientation
Fairness in the Courts (Revised Results Mar. 31, 1999), reported in materials of the
Sexual Orientation Fairness Subcommittee Meeting of Apr. 9, 1999, at 21 (quoting a
survey respondent: "I did not tell the truth about having a partner because I was not
comfortable being 'out' in that setting. I pretended I was single-then 'passed' for
heterosexual.") [hereinafter Survey Data].
15. Jane Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy's Domain, 50 VAND. L. REV.
361, 371 (1997).
16. Dominic J. Brewer & Maryann Jacobi Gray, Sexual Orientation Fairness in
California Courts: Results from Two Surveys: Final Report, June 2000, at 20. This
report was incorporated into the SOF Report, infra note 38.
17. For a fuller discussion of consequences, see Eskridge, supra note 5, at 2442-
43; Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay,
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into the standard voir dire categories of married or single."5 They cannot
share in everyday social interactions because they must mask certain
aspects of their lives. 9
Further, open self-identity is more significant for lesbians and gay
men than it is for non-gay persons!' The non-gay person may not feel
any pressure to voice her sexual orientation explicitly.' She may do
so in any of the numerous ways in which this fact is normally
communicated, by pictures of a spouse or children at work,- by using
the pronoun "we" to describe daily activities,' or simply by allowing
people to presume that she is non-gay.24 For the gay person, each of
Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915 (1989).
18. See discussion ihtfra notes 315-20 and accompanying text.
19. L-A. Bar Report, supra note 1, at 31-34.
[At social events] gay and lesbian attorneys are most likely to feel and be
perceived as 'different'-usually attending events without a date/spouse.
making it more difficult to enjoy the event and participate fully. As a result.
they are often perceived by other attorneys as antisocial or mysterious... not
fitting in.
Id. at 33 (quoting response from a gay or lesbian attorney respondent).
20. Eskridge, supra note 5, at 2442.
21. Non-gay people are open about their sexual orientation in myriad ways without
anyone thinking about it. Indeed, the awkwardness of the expression "openly non-gay"
to describe the sexual orientation identity of heterosexuals illustrates how little we
consider the public nature of heterosexuality.
22. Do not underestimate the significance of this distinction. The L-4. Bar Report
found that nearly one-half of all respondents, regardless of sexual orientation and sex.
believed that simply discussing one's personal or family life in a manner that revealed
the sex of one's parter-a matter of no consequence for non-gay attorneys-would
harm a gay or lesbian attorney's career. LA. Bar Report, supra note 1, at 31.
23. See supra text accompanying note 1; see also All Things Considered: Gay
Teacher Files First Amendment Lawsuit in Utah (NPR radio broadcast Oct. 21, 1997)
(discussing lesbian coach and teacher threatened by school district with termination from
tenured position if she talked with students, staff, or parents about her sexual orientation
or life). The report states:
[John Biewen, host]: Weaver says in Spanish Fork, a town of 12000, the
order meant she couldn't have ordinary conversation with most people in or
out of school.
[Wendy Weaver, school teacher, Spanish Fork, Utah]: If I was in a
classroom and I said something about, oh, Rachel and I went somewhere for
the weekend, and---that that could be in violation. I went in and asked them
actually that even if I was at the ball park, and was talking to somebody, and I
didn't know whether they had a student in the school or not, if that could be
part of What this memo was saying, and they said yes.
24. Indeed, gay people must affirmatively break the assumption of heterosexuality
to disclose their sexual orientation publicly. When a non-gay couple kiss in public, it is
not viewed as a statement about sexual orientation. Conversely, when gay people
engage in those same activities, it is often perceived as "flaunting" one's sexual
these situations calls for a conscious decision as to what to say or do,
how much to disclose or allow to remain unspoken.'
Further, most lesbians or gay men are not visibly identifiable. 6
Because of this, the revelation of gay or lesbian identity usually takes
place through speech or communicative conduct in order to break the
assumption of heterosexuality that silence often brings. Accordingly,
the courts have often jurisprudentially intertwined lesbian or gay
identity28 with the First Amendment. 9
orientation. Singer v. United States Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 249 (9th Cir.
1976). This "fear of flaunting" has often justified negative employment consequences
for lesbians or gay men. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997); see also
L.A. Bar Report, supra note 1, at 5-40 (describing the consequences of being an openly
lesbian or gay attorney in Los Angeles County).
25. See Cullen, supra note 10. The author noted one man's attempt to avoid
detection:
He loosened those ties [with non-gay friends] by convincing his work friends
that he found Colorado Springs stifling, and shifted all his free time to Denver,
routinely spending three to five nights a week up there.
But the constant questions of his juggling strategy still dog him-"What
you been up to? What did you do this weekend?"--requiring an elaborate
fictional life. "I have to be careful," Alex says. "I have to be guarded when I
come back from a weekend and start talking about where I've been or what
I've done."
He has spent enough time in Denver's straight clubs to swap them with
the gay bars; dates and tricks are converted to feminine counterparts. "I try to
keep it as close to the truth as possible, because if I have to retell the story, I'm
not going to stumble over things," he says. "If some guy has a broad chest,
she's got a rack. A guy named Clay becomes Claire. Everything else pretty
much stays the same."
Id.
26. Contrary to many people's beliefs, non-gay persons are often incapable of
identifying lesbians or gay men who do not wish to disclose their sexual orientation.
WARREN J. BLUMENFELD & DIANE RAYMOND, LOOKING AT GAY AND LESBIAN LIFE 86
(1993).
27. Eskridge, supra note 5, at 2442.
28. There is a lively debate among scholars on whether a gay and lesbian identity
exists, and particularly whether one can properly use "lesbian or gay man" to describe
persons engaged in same-sex sexual activity before the mid-nineteenth century. E.g.,
John Boswell, Revolutions, Universals, and Sexual Categories, in HIDDEN FROM
HISTORY: RECLAIMING THE GAY AND LESBIAN PAST 17, 23 (Martin Duberman et al. eds.,
1989); Martin Dannecker, Towards a Theory of Homosexuality: Socio-Historical
Perspectives, in GAY PERSONALITY AND SEXUAL LABELING I (John P. De Cecco ed.,
1985); Mary McIntosh, The Homosexual Role, in THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
HOMOSEXUAL 30 (Kenneth Plummer ed., 1981); Joseph Cady, "Masculine Love,"
Renaissance Writing, and the "New Invention" of Homosexuality, 23 J. HOMOSEXUALITY
9 (1992). Fortunately, the thesis of this Article does not depend on the correctness of any
one of these positions. In fact, as Professor Daniel Ortiz points out, there may be no
single definition of gay identity that can serve all purposes at all times. Daniel R. Ortiz,
Creating Controversy: Essentialism and Constructivism and the Politics of Gay hlentil,,
79 VA. L. REv. 1833, 1850 (1993).
29. E.g., Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 610-11
(Cal. 1979); David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy:
First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
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About twenty years ago, judicial opinions began to distinguish
between one's status as lesbian or gay, which they held insufficient
grounds for dismissal from employment, and public disclosure or
expression of one's sexual orientation, which constituted an appropriate
reason for termination." The most famous modem example of this
division is the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy." Additionally,
some family law courts employ a similar distinction in custody decisions
involving lesbian or gay parents."2
Other early cases employed free speech concepts to permit lesbians
and gay men to come out of the closet. For example, in Gay Law
Students Ass'n v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.," the California
Supreme Court held that disclosing one's sexual orientation was a
political statement about gay rights. Therefore, California statutes
protecting political expression shielded openly lesbian and gay
employees from termination."
L. REV. 319, 319 (1994); see also Nan D. Hunter, Identihy Speech, and Eluality, 79 VA.
L. REv. 1695 (1993).
30. Compare Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1163-64 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (relying
on due process to protect federal employee dismissed because of off-job, same-sex
conduct), with Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 2.56 (9th Cir.
1976) (upholding dismissal of gay employee who publicly "flaunted" his sexual
orientation and lifestyle), vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977), and McConnell v. Anderon.
451 F.2d 193, 196 (8th Cir. 1971) (upholding dismissal of gay employee).
31. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994) (codifying "don't ask, don't tell" policies of the
military); see also Cole & Eskridge., supra note 29, at 332 (discussing testimony of
General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the difference
between lesbian or gay identity and disclosure of that identity on a soldier's ability to
perform in the military); Ed Bradley, 60 Minutes: Don 't Ask Don't Tell: Lav Regarding
Homosexuals in the Military (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 12, 1999) (discussing the
policy and the conviction of a soldier for killing another soldier believed to be gay). For
an interesting account of the challenges and costs associated with living as a gay man in
the military, see Dave Cullen, Don't Ask Don't Tell, Don't Fall in Love. SALO.\, at
http/www.salon.comnewsfeaturel2000l06/06/officerslprinLhtml (June 6. 2000);
Cullen, supra note 10; Daryl Lindsey, The Cost of the Closet, SALo., at http//
www.salon.comlnewslfeature/2000/06/06/gayslprinLhtml (June 6, 2000). Commentators
have discussed this policy thoroughly. E.g., Cole & Eskridge, supra note 29, at 332.
Further discussion of the military regulations is beyond the scope of this Article.
32. E.g., S.E.G. v. .LA.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)
(discussing the activities of a mother in a lesbian relationship as imposing her sexuality
on her children and the community, and finding her, therefore, unfit to have custody or
visitation). The court in S.E.G. noted: "She [the mother] has chosen not to make her
sexual preference private but invites acknowledgment and imposes her preference upon
her children and her community." Id. at 167. See also In re J.B.F. v. J.M.F., 730 So. 2d
1190, 1194 (Ala. 1998); Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d 898,903-04 (N.C. 1998).
33. 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
34. ILat610-11.
However, recently the United States Supreme Court permitted persons
to assert First Amendment rights as a sword to exclude lesbians and gay
men, and to keep them closeted. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group, Inc.35 and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,6
the Court allowed the exclusion, on free speech grounds, of lesbian and
gay persons from participation in American social institutions. In fact,
the dissent in Dale cautioned that the Court's current First Amendment
jurisprudence effectively affixes a sign to openly gay or lesbian persons
that justifies their exclusion. Yet, as a recent, groundbreaking,
empirical study of California courts demonstrates,38 it would be
erroneous to attribute that exclusionary sign solely to the Court's recent
doctrine. Even in settings in which legal mandates specifically require
equal and unbiased treatment of lesbians and gay men, the experiences
of lesbians and gay men are often very different once others learn their
sexual orientation.39
This Article will first explore how the Supreme Court's recent speech
decisions in Hurley and, particularly, in Dale have transformed lesbian
and gay identity into speech with the result that others are able to force
gay people back into the closet. This Article will then empirically detail
the findings of the California Judicial Council study in order to
substantiate or invalidate parts of the Court's expressive association
analysis and to illustrate the extrajurisprudential pressures on lesbians
and gay men to remain closeted.'
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PUSH TOWARD THE CLOSET
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, Inc.,1
the Supreme Court held that a Massachusetts statute prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation could not require the Boston
St. Patrick's Day Parade to include GLIB, a group of Irish-American gay
35. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
36. 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
37. Id. at 2476 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. Sexual Orientation Fairness Subcomm., Access & Fairness Advisory Comm.,
Sexual Orientation Fairness in the California Courts (Jan. 31, 2001) [hereinafter SOF
Report].
39. See discussion infra Part III.
40. By discussing the pressures on lesbians or gay men to remain closeted, the
author is not suggesting that public awareness or discussion of homosexuality is less now
than in the past. On the contrary, visibility of lesbians or gay men has increased
dramatically. See, e.g., John Leland, Shades of Gay, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20, 2000, at 46.
As one author put it, in modem American life, homosexuality has gone "from 'the love
that dare not speak its name' to 'the love that won't shut up."' Jonathan Alter, Degrees
of Discomfort, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 12, 1990, at 27.
41. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
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men, lesbians, bisexuals, and their supporters. Specifically, the Court
held that the use of the statute violated the First Amendment rights of the
parade sponsors, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council (the
"Council").42 The Council had refused to allow GLIB to participate as
its own organization carrying its own banner."3 The parade organizers
stated that they did not exclude lesbians, gay men, or bisexuals, and
would have allowed them to march as members of another group the
Council had permitted to participate." Thus, a gay person could have
participated in the parade as a member of the AFL-CIO, of several
marching bands, of South Boston Against Drugs, or of the South Boston
Baptist Bible Trolley.
45
The Supreme Court found that this distinction meant that the
Massachusetts antidiscrimination law did not apply normally to the
Council's decision. 6 For the Court, the Council had not discriminated
against any gay man, lesbian, or bisexual as such, and the law did not
address any sexual orientation dispute. Rather, the Court stated that the
sole issue was GLIB's admission as a parade unit under its own banner."
As stated by the Court, GLIB's purpose in marching was "to express
pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual
individuals, to demonstrate that there [were] such men and women
among those so descended, and to express their solidarity with like
individuals who sought to march in New York's St. Patrick's Day
Parade."" Since the parade was communication, requiring GLIB's
participation would have forced a particular message upon the Council's
speech in organizing the march. That forced inclusion violated the
Council's First Amendment autonomy to choose the content of its
expression."
42- Id.at559,581.
43. Id. at 572.
44. Id. As others have demonstrated, the Court may have oversimplified and baen
overly generous to the Council's positions. E.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
Accommodating Outness: Hurley, Free Speech, and Gay and Lesbian Equaliy, 1 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 85, 98-100 (1998). Because this Article begins its analysis with the Hurley
doctrine, it has no need to reexamine the doctrine's factual predicates.
45. These groups were all part of the 1992 parade. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Group, Inc. v. City of Boston, 636 N.E.2d 1293, 1296 n.9 (Mass. 1994).
rev'd sub nom Hurley, 515 U.S. at 557.
46. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 561.
49. Id. at 572-73.
A closer examination of this reasoning, however, shows that it glossed
over several important issues, although it ultimately reached the correct
conclusion. Once accepted by the Court, the Council's distinction
between marching as a member of GLIB or marching as a member of
another parade participant effectively erased GLIB's lesbian and gay
identity message. While an openly gay or lesbian Irish-American might
have marched in the Boston St. Patrick's Day Parade, there is little
chance that any particular viewer would have known that fact. Most
lesbians or gay men, even open ones, are not visibly identifiable as such.
Without the GLIB banner, a marcher's gay identity is hidden. The
refusal to permit a marcher to identify him or herself openly as gay or
lesbian, but only as a member of another organization, forces that open
gay person back into the closet. The Court's First Amendment doctrine
reinforced that closet door.5
An analogy may clarify this reinforcement of the closet. Imagine a
group of Irish-American women who wished to participate in the parade
under their own banner proclaiming their pride in their identity as
women of Irish ancestry. If the Council did not allow those women to
march separately, but only as members of some other approved
organization, their female identity would not be erased.' Even if they
marched as carpenters, for example, parade viewers would still see that
Irish-American women exist. Unlike sexual orientation, sex is an
independently visible characteristic."
Paradoxically, because lesbian or gay identity needs to communicate
that fact to be open, Hurley correctly focused on speech and the First
Amendment as the key to the decision. In this context, participating in
the parade while carrying GLIB's shamrock-strewn banner proclaiming
"Irish American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston " is
precisely the crucial communication of an open lesbian, gay, or bisexual
identity. The Court recognized this fact:
50. Eskridge, supra note 5, at 2461.
51. Id.
52. Of course, one's sex is not always immediately apparent, as movie plots and
some real lives can attest. E.g., BoYs DON'T CRY (Twentieth Century Fox 1999); TtlE
CRYING GAME (Miramax Films 1992); VICTOR[VICTORIA (MGM/UA 1982); Gender-
Bending Played to the Hilt: Joan Smith Tells the Strange Story of Jazz Pianist Billy
Tipton, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 23-24, 1999, at 6 (discussing Billy Tipton's story); Kim
A. Lawton, Joan of Arc: An Unlikely Popular Icon Today, PLAIN DEALER, May 15, 1999,
available at 1999 WL 2363213 (telling the story of Joan of Arc); Deb Price,
Transgendered Have Lessons for Society, DETROIT NEWS, June 26, 2000, at A9,
available at 2000 WL 3482557 (telling the real-life story of Teena Brandon/Brandon
Teena, on which Boys Don't Cry was based).
53. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570.
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Although GLIB's point (like the Council's) is not wholly articulate, a
contingent marching behind the organization's banner would at least bear
witness to the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or bisexual, and the presence
of the organized marchers would suggest their view that people of their sexual
orientations have as much claim to unqualified social acceptance as
heterosexuals and indeed as members of parade units organized around other
identifying characteristics. -
That particular communication was exactly what the Council wanted
to delete from its parade message. The Court continued:
The parade's organizers may not believe these facts about Irish sexuality to be
so, or they may object to unqualified social acceptance of gays and lesbians or
have some other reason for wishing to keep GLIB's message out of the parade.
But whatever the reason, it boils down to the choice of a speaker not to
propound a particular point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond
the government's power to control."'
The Court correctly recognized three important points. First, being
openly lesbian or gay may have meant many different things to
individual GLIB members;" however, the common reason for being
open in this particular context was to show that lesbians and gay men of
Irish ancestry existed." Thus, it was not merely being lesbian or gay that
was important. What was important was that others should recognize
that Irish-Americans could be gay as well as marching band members or
firefighters, etc.5
Second, essential to GLIB's message of inclusion was the ability to
march under an identifying banner in the same way that other parade
organizations participated. GLIB's inclusion as a participant equal to
other parade groups was the specific communicative goal of these
particular lesbians and gay men:" Marching in a separate paradeP would
not have made the same statement and may have reinforced the idea that
lesbians and gay men are not part of the mainstream."' Accordingly,
54. Id. at 574.
55. Id. at 574-75.
56. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446.2477 n.24 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("For John Doe to make a public statement of his sexual orientation to the
newspapers may, of course, be a matter of great importance to John Doe. Richard Roe,
however, may be much more interested in the weekend weather forecast.").
57. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561.
58. Id. at 574.
59. Id.
60. Id at 570.
61. Lesbians and gay men have marched in other ethnic or racial pride parades.
E.g., Gamalier De Jesus, 1Quienes Sonos? What Is This Thing Called Idntity. VILLAGE
Voica, July 2, 1996, at 27 (reporting that Latino/a gay and lesbian groups have openly
GLIB's use of the Council's parade was essential to its statement of
inclusion. In essence, GLIB needed to speak through the Council to
convey its message."
Third, if the Court had allowed GLIB to march under its banner in the
St. Patrick's Day Parade, parade viewers would have understood GLIB's
message of equality with other parade participants. GLIB would have
joined the parade like all the other groups, and consequently, the
audience would have seen it in that capacity-as an equal. It would
have changed the mix of participants in the parade.63 Therefore, in this
case, being openly lesbian or gay was more than mere identity. GLIB
intended its openness as expressive activity. Further, the audience
would have perceived it as such. Once again, the use of the parade was
essential to that message. Accordingly, the Court correctly held that the
Council's First Amendment rights were implicated.
In contrast, the Court's most recent foray into the First Amendment
implications of lesbian or gay identity misapplied Hurley and
erroneously analyzed the message that was signified by gay identity.
However, because of the prevalent schemas of lesbians or gay men and
their consequent experiences in much of American society, the Court
accurately held that membership of an openly gay man would change the
organization's message. In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,4 the Court
held, in a 5-4 decision, that New Jersey's public accommodation anti-
discrimination statute could not require the Boy Scouts to admit James
Dale, an openly gay man, as an assistant scoutmaster. 6 Specifically, the
Court held that Dale's admission as an assistant scoutmaster would
unconstitutionally burden the Boy Scouts' First Amendment freedoms of
participated in New York City's Puerto Rican Day Parade since 1989); Terry Wilson,
Gay Community Unites to Celebrate Its Pride, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 1994, at NI (reporting
participation of black and Latino groups in several parades hosted by Chicago's
communities of color); Teresa Wiltz, Black Gays, Lesbians Begin to Fight Back, CHI.
TRIB, Aug. 15, 1993, at CI (reporting participation of black gay and lesbian group in
Bud Billiken parade, a celebration in Chicago's South Side). But see Jungwon Kim,
India Day Dispute: Celebration Parade Bans Gay-Rights Marchers, NEWSDAY,
Aug. 13, 1997, at A8, https://library.newsday.com/cgi-bin/display.cgi?id=3ac028a71358
cMpqaweblPl1000&doc= (reporting exclusion of Asian-American gay, lesbian, and
bisexual group from New York City's India Day Parade).
62. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). African-American civil rights
protesters entered the reading room of "whites only" public library and requested a book.
Id. at 136. The protest message depended on black persons taking an action prohibited
to them, but allowed to whites in that location. Id. at 141-43.
63. Admittedly, it was already a very eclectic conglomeration. E.g., Hurley, 515
U.S. at 569.
64. 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
65. Id. at 2449. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority, with Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joining him. Id. Justice Stevens dissented,
joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at . Justice Souter also penned a
dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. Id. at 2478.
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expressive association and their ability to advocate public or private
viewpoints.'
In Dale, the Court faced the First Amendment implications of the
mere presence of lesbians or gay men within private organizations."'
Significantly, the Boy Scouts did not expel Dale because of poor or
inappropriate behavior, sexual or otherwise, or because he had used his
assistant scoutmaster position to advocate his beliefs on homosexuality
to his troop.6' Rather, the Boy Scouts revoked Dale's membership
because their policies "specifically [forbade] membership to
homosexuals."70
Throughout the Court's opinion, James Dale is referred to as an
openly gay man7' or an avowed homosexual.T" However, it is important
to specify exactly how Dale manifested his gay identity. Dale
acknowledged his homosexuality to himself and to others while in
college.' Scouting executives learned of Dale's homosexuality when a
local New Jersey paper interviewed Dale when he was copresident of
Rutgers University's Lesbian/Gay Alliance.4 Importantly, the article
did not mention Dale's connection with scouting." Dale did not express
any opinion about scouting policies nor did he suggest that the Boy
Scouts should allow him to advocate the acceptance of gay people." No
one in the Scouting organization knew Dale was gay before seeing the
article, nor did the boys in Dale's troop or their families know of Dale's
sexual orientation before or after Dale's statements at the University."
Thus, the case turned on Dale's gay status, and not on his conduct,
advocacy, or beliefs.78 Although Dale was openly gay at college and at
66. Id. at 2449, 2455.
67. Id. at 2449.
68. Id. at 2465 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 2472-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 2449 (quoting a letter from James Kay, Executive Monmouth Council,
BSA, detailing the reason for Dale's expulsion).
71. Id. at 2454.
72. Id. at 2449, 2455.
73. Id. at 2449.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2472-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the relevant sections of the
article).
76. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196. 1225 (NJ. 19991 (discussing
the article).
77. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2476-77,2477 n.24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. At oral argument, the Boy Scouts claimed that they were concerned with
advocacy and conduct, and not status. Transcript of Oral Argument, Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000) (2000 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 44, at 03 (Apr. 26,
other associated settings, there was no evidence that he was open within
the Scouting community. The Court's failure to make this distinction
undermines its reasoning.
The Court's discussion of this crucial point is both elliptical and
conclusory.
We must then determine whether Dale's presence as an assistant scoutmaster
would significantly burden the Boy Scouts' desire to not "promote homosexual
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.". .. [Aln expressive association can
[not] erect a shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere
acceptance of a member from a particular group would impair its message. But
here Dale, by his own admission, is one of a group of gay Scouts who have
"become leaders in their community and are open and honest about their sexual
orientation." Dale was the copresident of a gay and lesbian organization at
college and remains a gay rights activist. Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts
would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the
youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct
as a legitimate form of behavior.
79
The Court then examined Hurley." In particular, the Court explored
the distinction between completely excluding lesbians and gay men from
the parade or excluding them from marching behind the GLIB banner."
Quoting Hurley's analysis of the message GLIB's inclusion in the
parade would send,82 the Court in Dale continued:
Here, we have found that the Boy Scouts believes that homosexual conduct is
inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill in its youth members; it will not
"promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior." As the
presence of GLIB in Boston's St. Patrick's Day parade would have interfered
with the parade organizers' choice not to propound a particular point of view,
the presence of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would just as surely interfere
with the Boy Scout's choice not to propound a point of view contrary to its
beliefs.
8 3
Several aspects of the Court's analysis are particularly striking.'
Justice Rehnquist contrasted the acceptance of a person as a member of a
2000) (statement of George A. Davidson, counsel for the Petitioner)). As the balance of
this discussion shows, that statement is not entirely accurate.
79. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2453-54 (internal citation omitted).
80. Id. at 2454 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 574-75 (1995)). That quote is provided supra notes 54-55
and accompanying text.
81. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2454.
82. Id.
83. Id. (internal citation to the briefs and the record omitted).
84. There is a major dispute between the majority and dissents over the existence,
content, and dissemination of the Boy Scouts' position on homosexuality and Scouting.
Compare id. at 2452-54, with id. at 2460-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and id. at 2479
(Souter, J. dissenting). Because this Article focuses on lesbian and gay identity and the
Court's construction of it, the author has no need to resolve that dispute. This Article
takes at face value the Court's conclusion that the Scouts desire "not to promote
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior." Id. at 2453.
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particular group with the acceptance of Dale-"one of a group of gay
Scouts who have become leaders in their community and are open and
honest about their sexual orientation.' ' Although the majority failed to
explain the rationale for this comparison, there are two obvious
possibilities. One possibility is that Justice Rehnquist was implying that
Dale used his assistant scoutmaster position to advocate for gay rights or
to change Scouting policy.? However, there was no support in the
record for such an assertion. Moreover, Justice Stevens's dissent
specifically disclaimed that inference for the Court!'
Alternatively, the Court might have been suggesting that Dale was
such a celebrity that everyone knew his sexual orientation-even those
that saw him as an assistant scoutmaster. Again, there is no evidence for
that proposition in the record." Therefore, if neither of these
possibilities is true, but Dale's presence as an assistant scoutmaster still
forced the Boy Scouts to convey a message with which they disagreed,
then something more subtle must have been at work.
The Court conflated Dale's decision to be openly gay at Rutgers with
a decision by Dale to be openly gay at all times and in all aspects of his
85. Id. at 2454 (internal citation omitted).
86. The unsupported fear that gay people will use their position with an employer
to advance gay rights runs throughout public employment cases. E.g., Shahar v. Bowers,
114 F.3d 1097, 1111 n.1, 1116 n.9 (Ilth Cir. 1997) Tjoflat, J., specially concurring).
Similarly, courts often assume that gay people are incapable of separating their identity
as lesbians or gay men from positions that they must take at work. Id. at 1105, 1108.
But see id. at 1134 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
87. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2472-73 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
88. Id. at 2474 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 2475 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. Conceivably, the Boy Scouts could have been making a preemptive strike by
terminating Dale before his sexual orientation came to the attention of his troop or
others. However, this alternative does not correspond to the Court's language, which
speaks of a contemporaneous change in the Boy Scouts' message, and not a future
alteration. Moreover, fear of future consequences or public reaction to membership of
gay men in Scouting does not support an expressive association claim. Id. at 2471
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Transcript of Oral Argument, Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000) (2000 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 44, at *20-21 (Apr. 26, 2000)
(statement of George A. Davidson, counsel for the Petitioner)). The transcript states:
QUESTION: My basic question is, how do I know, how are we supposed
to find out whether the policy reflects very great concern about the conduct, or
reflects very great concern about public reaction? That was my question, and
how do we decide the mix of that'?
MR. DAVIDSON: Well, I'm not sure as a matter of First Amendment law
that one might decide for public reaction reasons to have a certain policy. rm
not sure of the legal relevance of that distinction.
Id.
life. However, the record indicated that Dale successfully separated
these two areas of his life until his termination by the Boy Scouts.9' He
was open at college, but not within Scouting. In order to be openly gay
as an assistant scoutmaster, he would have had to communicate his
sexual orientation within that community. Further, Dale's choice to
remain silent, if it expressed anything about his sexuality, presumably
conveyed that he was non-gay.
The inference of heterosexuality created by silence makes the quote
from Hurley apt. In contrast, the analogy to Dale is not. The Court
properly noted that the parade organizers in Hurley distinguished
between entirely excluding gay people from the parade and excluding
them only when they marched behind a GLIB banner. Accordingly,
there was no distinction based on status, but only on viewpoint. Hurley
noted that the latter situation conveyed a different message to parade
watchers than having lesbians or gay men participate within other
marching organizations.' While that latter participation effectively
closeted lesbians or gay men because people watching would assume
they were not gay, it did not literally bar them from the parade. As
noted earlier,93 that distinction is possible because lesbian or gay identity
is invisible unless manifested by the GLIB banner or some other
outward sign. However, this makes the analogy to Dale false. As
Justice Stevens noted in Dale, Dale did not carry a banner or sign, or
intend to communicate anything by his presence.' He was an assistant
scoutmaster who happened to be gay; once the Boy Scouts learned that
fact, they excluded him.
The Court's own comparison between the acceptance of a particular
group member and Dale, "one of a group of gay Scouts who have
become leaders in their community and are open and honest about their
sexual orientation," 95 seems to connote that Dale was flaunting his
homosexuality 96 and that he was excluded for that reason.7 Further, this
91. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2472-73, 2474 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, Inc. v. Boston,
515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995); see also Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2454 (citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at
574-75).
93. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
94. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2475 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 2454 (internal citation omitted).
96. The whole question 6f flaunting, distinguishing between open and not open
gay people runs throughout the relationship of lesbians and gay men to law. See, e.g.,
Cole & Eskridge, supra note 29, at 319 (discussing "don't ask, don't tell," the current
military policy on the compatibility of homosexuality and the armed services); see also
S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing the
activities of a mother in a lesbian relationship as imposing her sexuality on her children
and the community, and finding that she is, therefore, unfit to have custody or visitation).
In S.E.G., the court noted that "[the mother] has chosen not to make her sexual
580
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language suggests that Dale deserved his exclusion, or at least should
have expected it.93
However, open lesbian and gay identity cannot be separated from
expression. Unlike sex or race, where one's identity is visible, lesbian or
gay identity needs to be communicated to someone else to be visible and
open. Women or African-Americans can be visibly present in an
organization without explicitly having to communicate that fact.
Accordingly, one can properly contrast mere membership of women or
blacks from those who publicly "celebrate" their separate identity." A
gay person, on the other hand, needs to express that identity
affirmatively to escape the presumption of heterosexuality. Conversely,
if he is completely closeted and no one knows his sexual orientation,
then the organization does not realize it has an openly gay man as a
member. Consequently, the mere acceptance of Dale as a member
cannot alter the Scouts' views. The Court's comparison is meaningless
for lesbians or gay men. No organization would ever have to accept
openly gay or lesbian individuals because the instant they manifest that
identity to another, the organization's speech autonomy rights attach to
bar them.
Moreover, if gay men can be Boy Scouts only as long as no one
knows they are gay, then the antidiscrimination laws are ineffective
against these organizations' membership policies if they include an anti-
preference private but invites acknowledgment and imposes her preference upon her
children and her community." Id. at 167; see also discussion supra note 24.
97. Transcript of Oral Argument, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446
(2000) (2000 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 44, at *23 (Apr. 26, 2000) (statement of George A.
Davidson, counsel for the Petitioner)). The transcript states:
MR. DAVIDSON: Justice Souter, he put a banner around his neck when
he put-got himself into the newspaper and Scout leaders throughout
Monmouth Council sent the article in to headquarters. He created a reputation.
This a place he goes once a week, a camping trip once a month, summer camp
for a week. These are people that see him all the time. He can't take that
banner off. He put it on himself and, indeed, he has continued to put it on
himself in this week's Time Magazine, the Out 100, the New York Times.
Id.
98. The idea that gay and lesbian people who flaunt their sexual orientation
deserve worse treatment than those who are more discrete was a common feature of early
discrimination doctrine. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1166-67 (D.C. Cir. 1969):
Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 255 (9th Cir. 1976).
99. Cf. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2474 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("By donning the uniform
of an adult leader in Scouting, he would 'celebrate [his] identity' as an openly gay Scout
leader." (quoting Petitioners' Brief at 24)).
gay plank.'0 The New Jersey law gives all persons the right to
employment and public accommodations without discrimination because
of sexual orientation.01  However, there can be no discrimination
because of sexual orientation unless the person or organization knows of
the victim's orientation.'" Nevertheless, once the organization knows of
this identity, it may properly exclude that individual without
contravening antidiscrimination laws. Consequently, the sexual
orientation protections afforded under the law are effectively nullified.
However, the majority opinion in Dale was not alone in its incorrect
analysis of gay identity and speech. Justice Stevens contrasted Dale
with GLIB in Hurley. His dissent mistakenly contended that because
Dale carried no sign or banner, distributed no factsheet, and expressed
no intent to communicate, his mere presence as a gay member was not
communicative activity.' 3  This position, too, misconstrued the
relationship between lesbian and gay identity and expression.
Some examples may clarify the difference between identity and
expressive activity. For scenario one, imagine that Dale attends a Boy
Scout meeting in his assistant scoutmaster uniform and wears a sign
around his neck reading, "I am gay. Gay men are acceptable members
of the Boy Scouts." This is the closest analogy to Hurley. Dale's
identity as gay is publicly linked to his identity as a Scout. That
combination helps create a message of inclusion visible to the audience
at the meeting. As in Hurley, Dale's presence as an assistant
scoutmaster forces the Boy Scouts to send a message with which it
disagrees.
In scenario two, picture Dale as a widely known gay celebrity. As a
celebrity, everyone knows his sexual orientation." It is as if Ellen
DeGeneres °5 or Rock Hudson'06 were assistant scoutmasters. In this
100. This is especially true if the Court defers to the organization's assertion of its
message and the gay person's impairment of it. See id. at 2453.
101. N.J. STAT. ANN. §10:5-5 (West Supp. 2000).
102. Cf. Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Int'l, Inc, 82 F.3d 578 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing
this situation with regard to pregnancy); Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 47 F.3d
928, 932-33 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing disability); Protos v. Volkswagen, Inc., 797 F.2d
129, 133 (3d Cir. 1986) (discussing religion).
103. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2475 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. Cf. id. at 2475 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. Ellen DeGeneres is the comedian who made the cover of Time magazine when
both she and the character she played on television disclosed their homosexuality. Bruce
Handy, Roll Over, Ward Cleaver; And Tell Ozzie Nelson the News. Ellen DeGeneres Is
Poised to Become TV's First Openly Gay Star. Is America Ready or Not?, TIMti,
Apr. 14, 1997, at 78, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/1997/dom/970414/atele.rol
overward.html.
106. Rock Hudson, that icon of 1950s movie leading men, made headlines when he
disclosed his homosexuality and his AIDS diagnosis. Steve Daly, Closet Cases; Yes,
There Have Always Been Gay Stars, But Few Were Out Until Recently, ENT. WKLY.,
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scenario, there is no sign proclaiming that Dale is gay and that gay men
are acceptable members of Scouting. Nevertheless, that sign is
impliedly communicated to the audience because everyone knows his
gay identity. Accordingly, his presence as an assistant scoutmaster
carries additional expressive content. Here, too, Dale's inclusion as a
Boy Scout coerces the Boy Scouts into communicating something from
which they dissent. This is Hurley with the GLIB banner supplied by
implication. 7
For scenario three, assume that the scouting leadership knows Dale is
gay, but that the scouts and their families do not. Dale is openly gay in
some settings, but not in Scouting. His presence at Scouting functions
as an assistant scoutmaster is outwardly indistinguishable from a non-
gay assistant scoutmaster. This version of openness appears to be what
the Boy Scouts require of others in their non-Scouting identities and
beliefs.' Scenario three most closely approximates the facts in Dale.
Nevertheless, the most logical reading of the Boy Scouts' and the
Court's argument is that this scenario is only temporary and will
eventually turn into scenario two. Although Dale was not open within
Scouting when the leadership terminated him, at some point some of the
troop, their parents, or the public would discover Dale's sexual
orientation. At that point, the Boy Scouts' message would have changed
for those who knew Dale was gay just as in scenario two.
Oct. 2, 1998, at 65, LEXIS, Nexis; Jane Sugden, Fallen Stars: When Rock Hudson Died
a Decade Ago, He Was AIDS' First Celebrity Victin. Unfortunatel.y He Would Not Be
the Last, PEOPLE, Nov. 13, 1995, at 52.
107. Arguably, we need to present scenario four to fully illustrate the spectrum of
identity and expression. In scenario four, Dale is completely closeted. He recognizes he
is gay, but shares that information with no one. In this scenario, Dale's sexual
orientation can communicate nothing because it is unknown. Neither the Boy Scouts nor
the Dale dissent nor majority would find that his inclusion interferes with the Boy
Scouts' First Amendment freedoms. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000) (2000 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 44, at *I8 (Apr. 26,
2000) (statement of George A. Davidson, counsel for the Petitioner)). The transcript
states:
QUESTION: May I ask one follow-up question to the one I asked
before-if homosexual conduct violates the Scout code, being straight and so
forth, why is it relevant whether the man is open or not?
MR. DAVIDSON: Well, in two respects. First, if nobody knows about it.
it doesn't become an issue.
Id.; see also Dale, 120 S. CL at 2475-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally id. at
2453-54 (contrasting the mere presence of a member of a particular group within an
organization with the presence of an openly gay man within that organization).
108. ld. at 2473-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Further, in the second scenario the only message that Dale's presence
actually conveys is that he is gay. The audience supplies the additional
content that gay men are acceptable members of Scouting; whether or
not Dale subscribes to that message is irrelevant.' ° This jump from
identity to others' perception of a message that identity sends is at odds
with the Court's prior expressive association doctrine. The Court
historically has not permitted an organization to assume that the mere
presence of someone with a particular identity will change the group's
message. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, "0 the Court required the
admission of women in the Jaycees, as long as their views were
consonant with the group's positions." The Court refused to assume
substantive views merely from the sex of an aspiring group member,"'
and refused to assume that the mere inclusion of women would
necessarily alter the Jaycees' message."3 Accordingly, Roberts did not
permit an organization to subordinate a potential member's actual
viewpoints to his or her identity.
In Dale, Justice Rehnquist paid lip service to this distinction. He
stated that Hurley anticipated the result in Dale." 4 Hurley analogized the
Council's refusal to permit GLIB to march under its own banner to "a
private club [excluding] an applicant whose manifest views were at odds
with a position taken by the club's existing members.""5 However, this
citation undermines Dale instead of supporting it. Hurley, like Roberts,
speaks of excluding applicants whose views are inconsistent with the
organization's message, not applicants whose identity is conflated with
incongruent viewpoints. Nevertheless, Dale turns gay identity into
substantive positions on Scouting policy."6 The transformation from
identity into beliefs is exactly what Roberts rejected with respect to
109. See infra text accompanying note 176.
110. 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984).
111. Id. at 627. Moreover, in other First Amendment contexts, the Court has been
careful to ensure that consequences flow from a speaker's views or activities, and not
merely from his or her identity. Cf. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 244
(1963) (Clark, J., dissenting). In Edwards, a breach of peace conviction was overturned
for a civil rights protest by black high school and college students who marched in front
of the state house where a crowd of 200 to 300 mostly white onlookers were gathered.
Id. There was no threat of violence by the protesters or by anyone in the crowd
watching. Justice Clark rejected the Court's finding that there was no threat of violence:
"anyone conversant with the almost spontaneous combustion in some Southern
communities in such a situation will agree that the [town officials] [might] well have
averted a major catastrophe." Id.
112. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627-28.
113. Id. at 627.
114. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2457 n.4 (2000).
115. Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, Inc.
v. Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 581 (1995)).
116. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627-28.
584
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women.
Even more directly relevant to Dale, Roberts also rejected the
argument that the admission of women would change the Jaycees'
message because of the gender-based assumptions the audience tied to
female identity."' Nor would the audience's assumptions create a
different effect for the organization's public positions."" Those
arguments relied on generalizations about the relative perspectives of
men and women, which could not be accepted uncritically in legal
decision-making, even if they were statistically accurate."'
While similar, Roberts does not control the outcome of scenario two.
In Roberts, the Court properly refused the equation of women as
members with a dilution of the Jaycees' message of support for young
men in business. The member's sex told one nothing about her position
on men in business. Thus, Roberts correctly refused to assume contrary
views on that issue merely from female identity. However, if the
117. Id. at627.
118. Id. at 627-28.
119. 1& at 628 (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,433-34 (1984). and Heckler
v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 745 (1984)). The citation to Palmore is interesting. In
Palmore v. Sidoti, the Supreme Court held that private biases and the possible injury they
might inflict are impermissible considerations in child custody determinations. Palmore.
466 U.S. at 433-34. There, a white mother with custody of her white child had
remarried an African-American man. Id. at 433. The lower courts had taken custody
away from the mother because "[t]he wife [petitioner] has chosen for herself and for her
child, a life-style unacceptable to the father and to society." Id. at 431 (alterations and
emphasis in original). Despite the social disapproval of that relationship, the Supreme
Court stated that the potential for societal ostracism and resulting injury to the child was
not a reason to change custody from the mother to the father. By recognizing these
private prejudices in the courts, the state would be putting its imprimatur on them in
violation of the Constitution. Id. at 433.
However, if the event that holds the potential for social ostracism is the mother's
lesbianism, most courts either fail to recognize the parallels to Palmore or wongly reject
Palmore as inapposite precedent. Many courts find nothing inconsistent in using the
mother's relationship with a person of the same sex in the same manner as the mother's
relationship with a person of a different race was used by the trial court in Palmore. In
S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987), the Missouri court took
custody of four minor children from a lesbian mother because Union, Missouri, was a
small community where gays were not common nor openly accepted. Therefore, the
court believed it needed to protect the children from peer pressure, teasing, and
ostracism. Id. at 165; see also Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (1995). In
Bottoms, the court changed custody from the lesbian mother and female partner to the
child's maternal grandmother. Id. The court stated that "living daily under conditions
stemming from active lesbianism practiced in the home may impose a burden upon a
child by reason of the 'social condemnation' attached to such an arrangement, which will
inevitably afflict the child's relationships with its 'peers and with the community at
large."' Id. (quoting Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985)).
Jaycees' ideology were different, the result should change as well. At
best, the admission of women as full voting members signified that
women were equal in status to men within the organization, and by
extension, equal in status in the nation as a whole. Thus, if the Jaycees'
position were that women were inferior to men, the admission of women
as equal members would have sent a message to others inconsistent with
that view.20
Indeed, this equality message was the heart of GLIB's attempted
participation in the St. Patrick's Day Parade.' Accordingly, while the
Dale majority ignored the lessons of Roberts and assumed viewpoints
from identity, the dissent mistakenly emptied identity of all expressive
content.'22 Even without carrying a sign or banner, the admission of an
identifiably gay man as a Boy Scout leader does send a message; it says
that gay men are acceptable members of Scouting, equal to anyone else.
If lesbian and gay identity within Scouting communicates the
acceptance of gay men as equal members of the Boy Scouts, it says little
beyond that. In the earlier quote from Dale,'2 the Court described the
Boy Scouts' message as disapproval of "homosexual conduct as a
legitimate form of behavior."'' 24 Further, Dale's presence as a gay man
was inconsistent with that message. But, as a strictly logical matter,
homosexual conduct and lesbian or gay identity are two different things.
The record is silent as to Dale's homosexual conduct inside and outside
of Scouting' 2s because the case is not about his conduct or the Boy
Scouts' disapproval of his behavior. Dale is solely concerned with his
presence in the organization as an openly gay man.
Nevertheless, a common, but erroneous, schema of lesbians and gay
men is that identity is solely a matter of sex, of what happens in the
bedroom.'26 This schema has distorted legal doctrines concerning gay
120. Hence, the typical law professor's hypo after Roberts became whether the
American Nazi party would have to permit Jews as members. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1432 (3d ed. 1996).
121. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, Inc. v. Boston,
515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995).
122. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2475 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
124. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2453-54.
125. Id. at 2465 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. SASHA GREGORY LEWIS, SUNDAY'S WOMEN: A REPORT ON LESBIAN LIFE
TODAY 11 (1979). The author discusses the statement of one lesbian woman:
Something that people don't understand is that it's not who you go to bed with
that determines if you're straight or gay. Sex has nothing to do with it. You
can be celibate and gay. Identification as gay or straight is an emotional
thing-do you relate primarily emotionally to women or to men in an intimate
situation?... That was what was missing in my marriage. Sex was okay with
him. What was missing was the emotional intensity. I was never in love with
[VoL. 38: 565, 2001] Of Courts and Closets
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
people in a variety of areas.' 27 For example, opponents have dismissed
school organizations designed to provide support for lesbian and gay
students as mere opportunities for sexual encounters.'2 In Gay Student
Services v. Texas A & M University,,' ' a district court in Texas upheld
the denial of official University recognition for a lesbian and gay
students support group at Texas A & M based, in part, on expert
testimony that sexual activity would certainly take place at or shortly
after group meetings.'30 In contrast, the University had previously
permitted the formation of a women's awareness group and a black
students' awareness group, whose roles in the University community
paralleled those proposed by the lesbian and gay organization." '
Nevertheless, the University refused the support group's application
because it would lead to increased homosexual conduct that would
violate the Texas Penal Code as it then existed." The Fifth Circuitnisicthat the i  iffrcei
correctly rejected this conflation, recognizing that there is a difference
between being a lesbian or gay man and engaging in homosexual
him or with any other man. I didn't know what 'in love' meant until I had my
first lesbian relationship.
Id.
Some of the reactions to the Sexual Orientation Fairness Court Employee Survey also
illustrate this schema. Collected Responses to Court Employee Survey, Dec. 1999 ("(It
is a waste of money to study sexual orientation fairness in the courts.] Let's have the
courts become blind to what people do or do not do in the privacy of their bedrooms and
address individual incidents as they occur." (unpublished working paper, on file with
author)); L.A. Bar Report, supra note 1, at 44.
127. E.g., Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (CL App. 1981) (noting that gay
male cohabitors' agreement for support rejected inter alia, because the court found that
use of the term "lovers" demonstrated that the agreement was based on sexual behavior,
illicit meretricious consideration, although that term is often used among gay couples as
the equivalent of "spouse").
128. Carol Ness, Gay in America: 1996-Stirrings i the Heartland. S.F.
EXAMINER, June 24, 1996, at Al (quoting Ron Mullins, head of the Modesto, California.
conservative, antigay Traditional Values Coalition, opposing a high school group for
gays because "all they want to do is have their little meetings in schools so they can have
their liaisons, and that's not right"); Mike Thomas, Are Gay Rights a Civil Right? David
Caton Says No, and He Wats Florida Voters to Close the Debate Forever, FLA. MAG.,
July 18, 1993, at 8, 10 (quoting Rev. James Sykes, a Florida minister who believes that
gay men want pro-gay laws passed so that they can "walk down the streets j-ing off").
129. 737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984).
130. Id. at 1323 (offering testimony by University's expert that "it would be a shock
really, if there were not homosexual acts engaged in at or immediately after" gay student
group's meetings).
131. Id. at 1323 n.10.
132. Id. at 1320 n.4 (discussing a letter from University Vice President for Student
Affairs explaining denial); id. at 1322 n.7 (quoting from the trial transcript).
activity. 33 This difference, if it had been recognized by the Dale
majority," should have prevented the transformation of lesbian and gay
identity into advocacy of homosexual conduct.
Although the distortion of legal doctrine in Dale is subtler than in Gay
Student Services, it is still present. A gay man's presence in Scouting
implies that he is an equal and accepted member of the organization. If
the schema of gay and lesbian identity as purely sexual conduct were
true, the acceptance of a gay man into an organization would also entail
endorsement of his sexual practices.'35 The Court in Dale activated this
schema to find that Dale's existence as an openly gay Boy Scout leader
meant that the Boy Scouts were forced to promote homosexual conduct
as a legitimate form of behavior.'36
Without the erroneous schema, the message of encouragement of
sexual behavior does not follow from Dale's membership in the Boy
Scouts. Admission of a Jew to the American Nazi party would
communicate equality with other party members, but it does not follow
that the Nazis thereby promote keeping kosher, a Saturday Sabbath, or
any of the other religious practices of Judaism. 37 Similarly, if a Boy
Scout leader were quoted in the newspaper as having antiabortion
beliefs, it is hard to imagine that the Boy Scouts, therefore, would be
coerced to send a pro-life message, and even less likely to be seen as
promoting the blocking of clinic entrances, or other conduct."' Some
might argue that this analogy is inapt because one can be Jewish without
keeping kosher, or pro-life without blocking clinic doors. However,
most people assume that one cannot be lesbian or gay without engaging
in homosexual conduct. 39 Despite this widely held oversimplification,
lesbian and gay identity is not solely a function of sexual behavior."0
Even if one believes that gay identity is based on sexual behavior,
133. Id. at 1328; accord benShalom v. Sec'y of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 975 (E.D.
Wisc. 1980) (recognizing this difference in the context of discharge for violation of the
military regulations against homosexual activity).
134. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, three of the five Justices in the Dale
majority, were in dissent in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Their Romer dissent similarly conflated lesbian and gay identity with sexual
behavior. There, as here, the equation of identity and conduct permitted those Justices to
single out lesbians or gay men for different and worse treatment. For a complete
discussion of the ways in which equating gay and lesbian identity with sexual conduct
shaped the opinions in Romer, see Brower, supra note 3, at 84-90.
135. Or shall we say his assumed sexual practices.
136. This was the specific message that the Court found Dale's presence forced
upon the Boy Scouts. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2453-54 (2000).
137. See, e.g., Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1975) (discussing the
religious practices of Judaism).
138. See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2476 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139. See generally Romer, 517 U.S. at 641-42 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
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merely by accepting an openly gay member, the Boy Scouts would not
be sending the message that they promote homosexual conduct.
Assume, for example, an assistant scoutmaster who is a smoker."'
Assume further that people know that member's identity as a smoker
although he never smokes around his troop, nor while in uniform.
Despite public knowledge of his identity, it is hard to believe that the
Court would find that the presence of a smoker as an assistant
scoutmaster would coerce the Boy Scouts into promoting tobacco usage.
Being identified as a smoker or as gay appears different because of the
distinctiveness of gay identity in modem American society. Lesbian or
gay identity, once known, seems so extraordinary that people cannot
move beyond that fact."2 It is so powerful that it alters an organization's
message, even without the gay person intending to communicate
anything, and despite their attempts not to do so.""
This distinctiveness, and the Court's reaction to it, put lesbians and
gay men at a particular First Amendment disadvantage. The more
unusual lesbians or gay men appear in a specific context, the more likely
their identities will be seen to overshadow other facets of their
personalities for those people who know that they are gay. It is a well-
known psychological phenomenon that particularly distinctive, vivid, or
significant information tends to be the most accessible for the observer's
recall and use. The more socially expected or accepted information is,
141. Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer suggested that smokers and homosexuals
were both members of classes defined by disfavored conduct. See Romer 517 U.S. at
646 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. Of course, this phenomenon is not necessarily limited to lesbians or gay men.
For example, some African-Americans feel that race is always present in the way others
perceive them. Amy Harmon, How Race Is Lived in America: A Limited Partnership,
N.Y. TiIES, June 14, 2000, at Al. This article contrasts the experiences of Timothy
Cobb, a black internet entrepreneur, with those of his former white partner. Jeff Levy.
Id The article notes:
Told that a white executive at Mr. Levy's company had described him as a
"black James Bond," Mr. Cobb knew it was meant as a nod to his fondness for
gadgets and risk. But "why a 'black' James Bond?" he had wanted to know,
supplying his own answer. "Black is the identifier that goes before you,
always. It raises the odds that you will get a real reminder that you are an
outsider every time they meet you."
Id.
143. See generally Dale, 120 S. CL at 2476 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing
lesbian and gay identity as tantamount to a symbol of inferiority, citing Kenji Yoshino,
Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUI.
L. REv. 1753, 1781-83 (1996)).
the more readily it recedes in value and awareness. '4 Accordingly, few
people were surprised when the musical comedy actor, Nathan Lane,
disclosed that he was gay.'45 Gay identity neither overpowers nor shocks
in this setting because it is seen as typical or expected. Lane did not
become "that gay actor. ' ' 46 Lane's response to the sexual orientation
inquiry played upon those facts: "Look... I'm 40, I'm single and I work
in the musical theater-you do the math. What do you need,
flashcards?"''4 7 In contrast, Billy Bean, the former San Diego Padres
outfielder, remained closeted in baseball in order for his teammates and
the public to accept him as a ball player and so that their attention would
be on his abilities and not his homosexuality.' 8
The distinctiveness of lesbian and gay identity in certain contexts
creates pressures to remain closeted. ' 9 Dale's view of lesbian and gay
identity enshrines that pressure into First Amendment doctrine. This
doctrinal pressure creates a vicious circle for Dale and other lesbians and
gay men in non-stereotypical roles. If they are open, an organization
may exclude them from membership. If they hide those identities, no
one knows they exist. Moreover, they also reinforce the surprise that
attends the disclosure of others' gay identity because it becomes a rare
event. Their perceived rarity hurts other open lesbians and gay men
because it contributes to the distinctiveness that permits private
organizations to exclude them.
Conversely, the more mainstream the identity, for example, church
adherent, political party member,'-* smoker,' the less likely the
organization is to believe that the member's identity is so extraordinary
144. AARON M. BROWER & PAULA S. NURIUS, SOCIAL COGNITION AND INDIVIDUAL
CHANGE: CURRENT THEORY AND COUNSELING GUIDELINES 88 (1993); see also Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
Sc. 1124, 1124-31 (1974).
145. Bruce Mirken, Outing? Media Have a Problem with "In-ing," S.F. EXAMINER,
June 2, 2000, at A19.
146. But see Jill Vejnoska, 'Six Days' Shows off Ford in a Somewhat Different
Light, CHI. TRIB., July 2, 1998, at Tempo 4 (discussing concern that audiences would not
accept Anne Heche, Ellen DeGeneres's partner, as Harrison Ford's love interest in "Six
Days" once she disclosed her lesbianism). Apparently, that fear did not materialize.
147. Mirken, supra note 145.
148. Lydia Martin, He's Out-Finally; Billy Bean Spent His Big-League Career
Trying to Blend in, But He's Become an Unlikely Celebrity Since Revealing He Is Gay,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 31, 1999, at B20 (describing the life of Billy Bean and
quoting a player who said that a gay major league player would have to be a superstar in
order for the focus to be on him and not his sexual orientation); see also LA. Bar Report,
supra note I, at 9 ("In court, I was referred to as 'the dyke attorney.').
149. It also marginalizes lesbians or gay men. See discussion infra notes 327-30.
150. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2473-74 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (discussing possible outside activities for Boy Scout leaders).
151. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
590
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as to overshadow or change the group message.'- If many people share
that identity, others cease to notice it, except where specifically relevant.
Usual or socially accepted information more easily loses its value and
distinctiveness.'53 Accordingly, the disclosure of that identity within an
organization does not color the organization's message.
For example, in 1947, when Jackie Robinson joined the Brooklyn
Dodgers as its first black player, his membership in that organization
sent a message of integration and inclusion that everyone who saw him
in the Dodgers uniform understood.'" His existence as a major league
ball player meant that at least one African-American was joining
mainstream white America.'" In contrast, the common presence of
black baseball players in major league uniforms today sends such a weak
message that people barely perceive it. The message of inclusion has
not changed, only the distinctiveness of African-American identity and
the audience's awareness of it.' 6
The more people perceive lesbians or gay men to be different, with a
distinct identity, the more it colors the message of the groups to which
they belong. Therefore, more private groups will be able to use the First
Amendment as a sword to limit nondiscrimination regulations.
Moreover, when the Court defers to organizations in determining which
identities interfere with their message,' ' the Court grants greater
freedom for organizations to structure their membership criteria without
hindrance from antidiscrimination laws.SS
152. Compare Dale, 120 S. CL at 2476-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting). with Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, Inc. v. Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 572
(1995) (noting that various groups were allowed to march in the St. Patrick's Day Parade
apparently without distorting the message of the parade organizers).
153. See discussion supra note 144 and accompanying text.
154. William Hageman, Chicago's 55-Year-Old Secret: Jackie Robinson's Tryout
with the White Sox, CHI. TRm., Mar. 26, 1997, at Tempo I (discussing the consequences
for the Chicago White Sox as they signed Robinson, and for the Dodgers once they were
identified with integration and equality for African-Americans; blacks became Dodger
fans, rather than fans of their home teams).
155. Robert Curvin, Remembering Jackie Robinson, N.Y TLwEI.S MAG., Apr. 4.
1982, at 46, 50 (discussing Princeton sociologist Marvin Bressler's contrast of Joe
Louis's victories as individual achievements showing blacks could beat whites in sports
with Jackie Robinson's integration of the Dodgers).
156. African-American identity still remains distinctive in other contexts. Harmon.
supra note 142.
157. Dale, 120 S. CL at 2453.
158. By itself, this freedom is not bad policy, and is one of the foundations of the
similar public/private distinction within federal state action doctrine. See Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., Inc. 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) ("[Tlhe 'state action' requirement
Truly private organizations, like other American institutions such as
private residential communities, are essentially countersocial. They
exist to provide places where like-minded persons can gather, different
from what society in general provides, and free from restrictions
imposed on governments. Accordingly, they may have an incentive to
underappreciate public norms and values.9 Supreme Court doctrine has
previously resolved this tension. In 1948, the Court in Shelley v.
Kraemer used the federal Constitution to combat group bias and to rein
in private arrangements in order to ensure that they would not exclude
people based on identity."
In contrast, the Court's current free speech jurisprudence exacerbates
this tendency toward insularity and permits individuals to perpetuate
private biases or exclusions with constitutional protection from
government interference or regulation. This creates a First Amendment
version of Coppage v. Kansas6 ' and its Lochner-era" legitimation of
economic inequality through liberty of contract. Coppage stated:
No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there must and will be
inequalities of fortune.... [Thus, it is] impossible to uphold freedom of
contract and the right of private property without at the same time recognizing
as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the
exercise of those rights....
And since a State may not strike [those rights] down directly it is clear that
it may not do so indirectly, as by declaring in effect that the public good
requires the removal of those inequalities that are but the normal and inevitable
result of their exercise .... 163
Substitute "freedom of contract" and "private property" in the
previous quote with "freedom of association," and replace "inequalities
of fortune" with "inequalities in access or membership." Freedom of
association now carries with it the ability to exclude others, and thus
preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal
judicial power."). The difficulty arises when the Court assumes, or allows others to
assume, viewpoints or speech from mere identity without critically examining the
specific situation.
159. Todd Brower, Communities Within the Community: Consent,
Constitutionalism, and Other Failures of Legal Theory in Residential Associations, 7 J.
LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 203, 249 (1992).
160. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4, 20 (1948) (holding that private covenants in
neighborhood barring home sales to African-Americans are unconstitutional).
161. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
162. The Lochner era, named for Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), was
characterized by the Court's interpretation of liberty of contract as a Due Process right
protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Using that right, the Court struck
down nearly 200 state and federal economic regulations. That era lasted from the last
decades of the nineteenth century until 1937 and the Court's decision in West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 480-90 (1997).
163. Coppage, 236 U.S. at 17-18.
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legitimately provides some people with fewer options for roles in
society. Accordingly, the state cannot decide that the greater public
good requires that all people be treated equally with respect to
membership. As amended, the quote is congruent with Dale."
Dale erred in extending Hurley to permit private organizations to
exclude persons based on their identities and not their ideas. In
Coppage, the error was not in recognizing that economic inequality
exists, but in enshrining those discrepancies into constitutional law.
Similarly, in Dale, the error is not in recognizing that some people
assume substantive positions or beliefs merely from an individual's
identity, but in placing those misattributions into First Amendment
jurisprudence. The Court's opinion demonstrates that Dale's identity as
a gay man and others' perceptions of the message that identity conveys
are of primary importance, rather than Dale's own views on
homosexuality and Scouting.165
One way to test this distinction is to ask whether the Boy Scouts treat
gay and non-gay persons alike if they both openly disagree with Boy
Scout policy on sexual orientation. The Court responded to Dale's
argument that the Boy Scouts would not revoke the membership of non-
gay scout leaders who believed Scouting policy on homosexuality to be
wrong:
The presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist in an assistant
scoutmaster's uniform sends a distinctly different message from the presence of
a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as disagreeing with Boy
Scouts policy. The Boy Scouts has a First Amendment right to choose to send
one message but not the other.16
However, if those two messages are different, it is not the substantive
content of the message that makes them so, but the identity of the
164. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. CL 2446, 2457 (2000). The Court
stated:
We have already concluded that a state requirement that the Boy Scouts retain
Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly burden the organization's
right to oppose or disfavor homosexual conducL The state interests embodied
in New Jersey's public accommodations law do not justify such a severe
intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive association.
That being the case, we hold that the First Amendment prohibits the State
from imposing such a requirement through the application of its public
accommodations law.
165. Or assumed views, since before the litigation, he never expressed any position
on that topic. Id. at 2474 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 2455.
message proponent. Justice Rehnquist's language in the quoted passage
reinforces the dominance of identity over viewpoint in Dale. He
described Dale as "an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist in
an assistant scoutmaster's uniform."'67 Dale's identity was gay first,
activist second, and scout third, if at all. Dale was not an assistant
scoutmaster-he simply wore the uniform of one as if he were a gay
man in Boy Scout drag.
Now, contrast that description with the "heterosexual assistant
scoutmaster who is on record as disagreeing with Boy Scouts policy."'63
The noun in that clause is "scoutmaster"; he is a scout first, one who
merely holds an opinion. The Court's rhetoric illustrates the asymmetry
in its comparison and dictates its result. Moreover, the Court
specifically mentioned the non-gay assistant scoutmaster's beliefs.
Identity as non-gay apparently carries with it no conclusions as to one's
opinions. '69 This view is consistent with the Court's prior conclusion in
Roberts that sex was not inextricably tied to viewpoint.' In Dale, the
Court described the non-gay scout as "on record as disagreeing with Boy
Scouts policy."'7 ' That statement distanced the opinion on record from
the individual, as though the opinion had been expressed once in the past
and had never been brought up again.
In contrast, Justice Rehnquist never said Dale held an opinion about
Scouting policy nor did Dale articulate what his opinion might be. The
Court assumed his beliefs from his description as an avowed
homosexual and gay rights activist. Alternatively, the Court may have
relied on the audience's assumptions about Dale's advocacy from his
description as gay.'72 Again, this reliance on the audience's perceived
views contradicts Roberts.' Either way, Dale's identity as gay permits
the Court to assume a substantive ideological position in opposition to
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2473 n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that if non-gay scout leaders
are presumed to be able to separate their beliefs from their position as scoutmasters, gay
scout leaders should be entitled to that same presumption).
170. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984); see supra note I II
and accompanying text.
171. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2455.
172. Transcript of Oral Argument, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446
(2000) (2000 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 44, *49 (Apr. 26, 2000) (question asked of Evan
Wolfson, counsel for Respondent)).
QUESTION: ... They're saying it's advocacy-based, that by making the
public statements that he has made, he in effect has put himself in a position of
being identified, understood by people as an advocate, and therefore if he's in
a leadership position in the Scouts, by that very fact he's going to carry sort of
the aura of the advocacy with him.
Id.
173. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627-28; see supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
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the organization's message, a position that Dale did not express until
after that litigation commenced 74 Identity is conflated with advocacy,
as though lesbians or gay men have a monolithic position on
homosexuality and scouting 7- or on any other topic. Because the Court
tied Dale's advocacy intrinsically to his identity, Dale was seen as
continually expressing disagreement with Boy Scouts policy.
The transformation of gay identity into substantive views stems from
the perceptions of those who know an individual's sexual orientation. It
is textbook social psychology that people have schemas about persons or
situations, which enable them to know, or think that they know, what to
expect from those things.'76 Unsurprisingly, people also have schemas
about lesbians and gay men. Thus, they might perceive a lot of
information about an individual lesbian or gay man from their schema-
information that might in fact be false with respect to that individual.
For example, people might believe that all gay men are effeminate or
uninterested in sports," or that all lesbians are mannish,'8 when neither
174. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2474 n.20 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
175. Compare Brief Amicus Curiae of Gays and Lesbians for Individual Liberty in
Support of Petitioners, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct 2446 (2000) (1999
U.S. Briefs LEXIS 699), with Brief of Amici Curiae Bay Area Lawyers for Individual
Freedom et al. in Support of Respondent, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct 2446
(2000) (1999 U.S. Briefs LEXIS 699).
176. There is an extensive psychology literature on schema theory. BRowER &
NURius, supra note 144, at 14-15; NANCY CANTOR & JOHN F. KiHILS'O.M, PERSONALITY
AND SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE 1-2 (1987); ELLEN J. LANGER, MINDFULNESS 5 (1989); John
Bransford et al., Teaching Thinking and Problem Solving, 41 Am. PSYCHOL 1078. 1078-
89 (1986); Claudia E. Cohen, Goals and Schemata in Person Perception: Making Sense
from the Stream of Behavior, in PERSONALITY, COGNITION, AND SOCIAL INTERACTIoN 45
(Nancy Cantor & John F. Kihlstrom eds., 1981); Marvin R. Goldfried & Clive Robins,
Self Schemata, Cognitive Bias, and the Processing of Therapeutic Experiences, in 2
ADvANcES IN COGNITIvE-BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH AND THERAPY 33, 33--39 tPhilip C.
Kendall ed., 1983); John F. Kihlstrom & Nancy Cantor, Mental Representations of the
Self, in 17 ADvANcEs IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 1-44 (Leonard
Berkowitz ed., 1984); Peter Salovey & Jefferson A. Singer, Cognitive Behavior
Modification, in HELPING PEOPLE CHANGE: A TEXTBOOK OF METHODS 361. 372
(Frederick H. Kanfer & Arnold P. Goldstein eds., 4th ed. 1991). Karen Farchaus Stein,
Complexity of the Self-Schemna amd Responses to Disconfirming Feedback, 18 COGNMvE
THERAPY & RES. 161, 161 (1994); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 144. at 1124-31;
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availabilit." A Heuristic for Judging Frequency
and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973) (discussing judgmental heuristics).
For a complete discussion of how schemas about lesbians or gay men have shaped legal
doctrine, see Brower, supra note 3.
177. DAVID P. McWHRTER & ANDREW M. MATLTISON, THE MALE COUPLE: How
RELATIONSHIPS DEvELOP 246 (1984) (detailing group of blue collar gay men who drink
beer and watch sports on TV); Stephen F. Morin & Ellen M. Garfinkle, Male
Homophobia, 34 J. Soc. ISSUES 29,40-41 (1978).
of these assumptions is true.
Moreover, even individual counterexamples may not suffice to change
this schema. People often discount or ignore contradictory information
rather than incorporate it and modify the schema.'79 Schemas are,
therefore, resistant to alteration. The most opportune time for change
appears to be when the existing schema ceases to function adequately:
that is, when the schema does not properly represent factual
circumstances. Change often comes through forced and repeated
confrontation with compelling contrary information, such as occurs
when learning that a favorite aunt, teacher, or friend is lesbian or gay." '
The Boy Scouts's counsel may have inadvertently acknowledged as
much in oral argument. The Court asked counsel if the Boy Scouts
would terminate a non-gay person who had expressed the same opinions
as Dale had in the original newspaper interview. Counsel replied, "I
would observe that it would be open to the Scouts to conclude that
somebody who is himself presenting a personal example, as well as
advocating, might be more unacceptable than somebody who was
merely advocating." 82 This "personal example" explains why sexual
orientation identity is so crucial to the Scouts and to the Court's opinion.
Only lesbians or gay men can be personal embodiments of their
presumed positions on the acceptability of homosexuality.'83 Implied,
178. KARLA JAY & ALLEN YOUNG, THE GAY REPORT 42-43 (1979) (discussing a
girl who played boys sports labeled a "dyke"); id. at 54 (noting one girl who wore work
boots, work shirts, and jeans to school labeled a "lez"); SUZANNE PHARR, HOMOPHOBIA:
A WEAPON OF SEXISM 31 (1997). Some gay women also hold this view. MONIKA
KEHOE, LESBIANS OVER 60 SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES 46-47 (1989) (discussing one
woman's dislike of the term "lesbian" as connoting image of women trying to act like
men).
179. Stein, supra note 176, at 161.
180. An example is when the high school valedictorian needs to accommodate her
"naturally smart and effortlessly successful" self-schema to her mediocre first semester
college grades. Id. at 162.
181. Whether an individual personally knows a gay man or lesbian also
significantly influences her attitude toward gay people. Of those who knew a gay
person, seventy-three percent supported equal rights for gay people. Only fifty-five
percent of those who did not know a gay person supported equal rights. Straight Talk
About Gays, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 5, 1993, at 42. Similarly, those who
objected to gay people working as elementary school teachers were less likely to have a
gay relative or close friend. Jeffrey Schmalz, Poll Finds an Even Split on
Homosexuality's Cause, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1993, at A14 ("[O]nly 33 percent of those
who lacked a gay relative or close friend said they would not be bothered."). But see
David Kirby, Does Coming Out Matter?, ADVOCATE, Oct. 13, 1998, at 67 ("A new
Harris poll suggests that knowing people who are gay makes little difference in whether
one supports gay rights.").
182. Transcript of Oral Argument, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446
(2000) (2000 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 44, at * 13-14 (Apr. 26, 2000) (statement of George A.
Davidson, counsel for Petitioner)).
183. See Id. at *35 (Apr. 26, 2000) (question posed to Evan Wolfson, counsel for
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however, is the assumption that the message is intensified, or harder to
ignore, when the speaker both advocates and personally exemplifies the
message.
In fact, this intensification underlies the biblical story of Esther,'" who
saved the Jews by disclosing to King Ahasuerus that she, too, was
Jewish. Her disclosure forced the King to reconsider his edict to put the
Jews to death because it required him to see someone he loved as part of
the despised group. Similarly, having an exemplary scout and assistant
scoutmaster like Dale disclose his sexual orientation might have forced
those who knew him to reconsider the Boy Scouts policy against gay
men in Scouting in a way that a non-gay scout leader's advocacy of that
position never could. The potential to provoke a reevaluation of
previously held positions is one of the benefits of revealing one's lesbian
or gay identity, of coming out of the closet.'o It is also why some might
wish to keep lesbians or gay men closeted and silent.'
Of course, the intensification of advocacy when coupled with a
personal example is created only when his troop members know of
Dale's sexual orientation. Otherwise, his identity does not embody a
contradiction of Boy Scouts policy to them, and they are not forced to
reconsider that policy by seeing him in uniform. All that remains is his
outside advocacy. If the Boy Scouts had stopped here and made it their
policy not to have Dale discuss his sexual orientation within Scouting,"'
it would have forced him to remain closeted, but only in that realm."3
Respondent). The transcript states:
QUESTION: You think it does not limit the ability of the Boy Scouts to
convey its message to require the Boy Scouts to have as a Scout master
someone who embodies a contradiction of its message, whether the person
wears a sign or not? But if the person is publicly known to be an embodiment
of the-of a contradiction of its moral message, how can that not dilute the
message?
Id.
184. Esther 2:5-8:9. The story was retold in JEAN RACINE, ESTHER (H.R. Roach
ed., 1949), and extensively analyzed by SEDGWicK, supra note 2, at 76-79.
185. Deb Price, Gays Increasingly Become Role Models, DETROrr NEs, Mar. 27,
2000, at Opinion 9 (describing changing attitudes of Americans towards accepting
lesbians and gay men, particularly as they learn of more people who are gay).
186. Richard Rodriguez, Gay Peril: Return to the Oppression of Silence, S.F.
EXA MIER, Oct. 16, 1998, at A21 (stating that by keeping lesbians or gay men from
being openly gay and discussing their sexual orientation, homophobes hope to diminish
gay rights by keeping the issue out of sight).
187. Justice Stevens's dissent stated that that is the policy. Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446,2462 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. Apparently, Dale had already arrived at that accommodation on his own. See
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However, the Court's conflation of Dale's identity with an anti-Scouting
policy message makes that accommodation impossible. He was a
personal counterexample to Scouting policy whether or not he ever
engaged in advocacy. From the perspective of the Scout leadership and
Rehnquist's opinion, whether or not the recipients of the Boy Scouts'
message knew of Dale's homosexuality, the leadership knew."'
Consequently, his mere presence as an assistant scoutmaster changed
their message' ° because for them Dale literally incorporated a
counterexample to their policies. He was no longer their representative
like any other assistant scoutmaster.'9  He was a gay assistant
scoutmaster, or in the words of the Court, "an avowed homosexual and
gay rights activist in an assistant scoutmaster's uniform."' 92 This view
uses the First Amendment as a sword to push gay men back into the
closet or lose their affiliation with an organization.
According to Justice Stevens, the Court's conclusion effectively
supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
189. The Court's approach has a certain "tree falling in the forest with no one
around to hear it" quality about it. The Boy Scout administration perceives something in
Dale's presence that others do not because it has information about him that others do
not share. This view is at odds with prior First Amendment doctrine, which has
traditionally required expressive conduct to contain both a speaker's intent to
communicate and the likelihood that the audience would understand the message
perceived. E.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974). In holding that
the First Amendment protected the taping of a peace symbol on an American flag in
violation of a flag desecration statute, the Court emphasized two factors necessary for
expressive conduct: "An intent to convey a particularized message was present, and in
the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it." Id. Hurley recognized both halves of this
definition. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 575 (1995). The Court focused on both GLIB's message and the parade audience's
perceptions. It was relevant that people would view GLIB's speech as that of the parade
organizers. Id.; see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. I, 15
(1986) (noting that coerced access to utility company's billing envelope was
unconstitutional because the company would be forced either to appear to agree with the
inserted material or to respond to it). That perceived change in message was one of the
underpinnings of the opinion, and distinguished Hurley from Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994) (upholding FCC regulations against a
First Amendment autonomy challenge because of minimal risk that cable viewers would
associate broadcast stations' messages with the cable operator itself).
190. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct.
2446 (2000) (2000 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 44, at *18 (Apr. 26, 2000) (statement of George
A. Davidson, counsel for the Petitioner)).
191. L.A. Bar Report, supra note 1, at 32. One heterosexual attorney stated: "Once
it's out [that an attorney is homosexual], interpersonal relationships with co-workers
change." Id. One gay attorney remarked: "There was a subtle chill in my relations with
the office after I came out." Id. Louis Sahagun, Lesbian Coach Sues Utah School, L.A.
TIMEs, Oct. 22, 1997, at A3 (noting that once one lesbian teacher told student she was
gay, her school principal removed her as coach because "his perception [of her] had
changed" after eight years).
192. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2455.
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placed lesbians and gay men in an inferior position.
The only apparent explanation for the majority's holding, then. is that
homosexuals are simply so different from the rest of society that their presence
alone--unlike any other individual's-should be singled out for special First
Amendment treatment. Under the majority's reasoning, an openly gay male is
irreversibly affixed with the label "homosexual." That label, even though
unseen, communicates a message that permits his exclusion wherever he goes.
His openness is the sole and sufficient justification for his ostracism. Though
unintended, reliance on such a justification is tantamount to a constitutionally
prescribed symbol of inferiority. As counsel for the Boy Scouts remarked. Dale"put a banner around his neck when he... got himself into the newspaper ....
He created a reputation.... He can't take that banner off. He put it on himself
and, indeed, he has continued to put it on himself."'193
The metaphor of a sign around the necks of openly lesbian or gay
persons, which singles them out for separate treatment, is particularly
appropriate. It echoes one of the flaws Romer v. Evans found in
Colorado's Amendment 2: 9 the segregation and stigmatization of the
class of lesbian and gay persons for disfavored legal treatment.'" In
Romer, the Court refused to let Colorado declare its gay and lesbian
citizens strangers to its laws,'9 and exclude them "from an almost
limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary
civic life in a free society."' 97 However, only four years later, in Dale,
the Court turned the First Amendment into a tool to make gay people
strangers to that same ordinary civic life.
Despite the majority opinion's doctrinal flaws, Dale accords more
accurately with the experiences of lesbians and gay men. People do
perceive them as different from the rest of society, and that difference
engenders unequal treatment. Justice Stevens's dissent correctly
identified the Court's jurisprudential stigmatization of gay people, and
yet was too sanguine about their treatment under more appropriate legal
doctrine. Stevens's dissent implied that ruling in favor of Dale would
remove the sign around the necks of lesbians or gay men and allow them
to participate equally in Scouting and other activities. Unfortunately, the
reality of lesbian and gay experiences is that once others know their
sexual orientation, they are often singled out for worse treatment-even
193. Id. at 2476 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
194. Romer v. Evans, 512 U.S. 620, 624 (1996). Amendment 2 would have
prohibited any governmental entity from protecting lesbians, gay men, or bisexuals from
sexual orientation discrimination. Id.
195. Id. at 627,633,635.
196. Id. at 635.
197. Id. at 631.
in situations in which legal rules exist to ensure their full and equal
participation.
III. THE SOCIAL AND NONDOCTRINAL PRESSURES FOR THE CLOSET
As important as legal doctrine is to equality, we should not confuse
the presence of legal doctrine mandating equality with actual equal
treatment and respect for lesbians or gay men. We can see this
distinction in the judicial system itself. We might expect that the courts
are one area of modem society in which legal doctrine and protections
for gay people persuasively create fairness and equality of treatment.
They are not.
California law specifically requires judges to demonstrate sexual
orientation fairness and refrain from sexual orientation discrimination.
Canon 3B(5) of the California Code of Judicial Ethics states:
A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall
not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or
prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex,
religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic
status. 98
Moreover, California judges are responsible for controlling the
behavior of those attorneys appearing before them to ensure that they,
too, refrain from sexual orientation bias or prejudice.' 99
The Standards of Judicial Administration promulgated by the
California Judicial Council echo these requirements:
Section I. Court's Duty to Prohibit Bias
(a) (General) To preserve the integrity and impartiality of the judicial
system, each judge should:
(1) (Ensure Fairness) Ensure that courtroom proceedings are conducted in
a manner that is fair and impartial to all of the participants;
(2) (Refrain From and Prohibit Biased Conduct) In all courtroom
proceedings, refrain from engaging in conduct and prohibit others from
engaging in conduct that exhibits bias, including but not limited to bias based on
disability, gender, race, religion, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, whether that
198. CAL. R. COURT, CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHics Canon 3B(5) (Daily Journal 2000).
199. Id. Canon 3B(6). The Cannon states:
A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain from
manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice bases [sic] upon race, sex,
religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic
status against parties, witnesses, counsel, or others. This Canon does not
preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex, religion, national origin,
disability, age, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, or other similar factors
are issues in the proceeding.
Id. Attorneys and legal employers are prohibited from discrimination based on sexual
orientation in employment or in accepting or ending representation of a client. CAL.
LAB. CODE §§1101, 1102, 1102.1 (West 2000); CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 2-
400 (1999).
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bias is directed toward counsel, court personnel, witnesses, parties, jurors, or
any other participants;
(3) (Ensure Unbiased Decisions) Ensure that all orders, rulings, and
decisions are based on the sound exercise of judicial discretion and the
balancing of competing rights and interests and are not influenced by
stereotypes or biases.20
Further, the Standards of Judicial Administration say that each local
court should establish a committee to assist and maintain a bias-free
courtroom environment. T ' These committees should include
representation from gay and lesbian organizations."' Additionally, the
standards state that courts should sponsor or support educational
programs designed to eliminate sexual orientation bias in the courts and
legal community,0 3 as well as develop and maintain bias complaint
procedures for sexual orientation incidents:"
The appointment of attorneys, arbitrators, mediators, referees, and
others, should be from diverse applicant pools. Such pools should
include sexual orientation diversity, and the recruitment and selection of
members of such pools should be without regard to sexual orientation. "
200. CAL. R. COURT, STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. § 1 (a) (Daily Journal 2000).
201. Id. § I(b).
202. Id. § l(b)(1).
203. Id. § 1(b)(2).
204. Id. § l(b)(3); §1(c)(7)-(8).
205. Id. § 1.5(a)-(c). Section 1.5 states:
APPOINTMENT OF ATTORNEYS, ARBITRATORS, MEDIATORS,
REFEREES, MASTERS, RECEIVERS, AND OTHER PERSONS
(a) (Nondiscrimination in appointment lists) In establishing and
maintaining lists of qualified attorneys, arbitrators, mediators, referees,
masters, receivers, and other persons who are eligible for appointment, courts
should ensure equal access for all applicants regardless of gender, race,
ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation, or age.
(b) (Nondiscrimination in Recruitment) Each trial court should conduct a
recruitment procedure for the appointment of attorneys, arbitrators, mediators,
referees, masters, receivers, and other persons appointed by the court (the
"appointment programs") by publicizing the existence of the appointment
programs at least once annually through state and local bar associations.
including specialty bar associations. This publicity should encourage and
provide an opportunity for all eligible individuals, regardless of gender, race,
ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation, or age, to seek positions on the rosters
of the appointment programs. Each trial court also should use other methods
of publicizing the appointment programs that maximize the opportunity for a
diverse applicant pool.
(c) (Nondiscrimination in Application and Section [sic] Procedure) Each
trial court should conduct an application and selection procedure for the
appointment programs which ensures that the most qualified applicants for an
appointment are selected, regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, disability,
Finally, judicial education' and court employee training" should
include sexual orientation fairness as one of its components. Despite
these legal protections and requirements for fairness and equal treatment
for lesbians or gay men, the reality of their experiences and perceptions
of the California court system is somewhat different.
Significantly, the disjuncture between legal rules and lesbians' and
gay men's real-world experiences illustrates that it is insufficient merely
to reason about lesbian or gay identity, its disclosure, or the message that
it sends. We should explore empirical studies to gather information
about gay people's treatment and perceptions, as well as to corroborate
or challenge the assumptions underlying legal doctrine.
On January 31, 2001, the Judicial Council of California accepted the
report of its Advisory Committee on Access and Fairness entitled,
"Sexual Orientation Fairness in the California Courts."' 8 This report
was among the first comprehensive, empirical studies of sexual
orientation fairness within American court systems.2" It is noteworthy
sexual orientation, or age.
Id. See generally id. § 1.6. Section 1.6 states:
SELECTION OF MEMBERS OF COURT-RELATED COMMITFEES
A court that selects members to serve on court-related committees should
establish procedures ensuring that all qualified persons have equal access to
selection regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation, or
age.
Id.
206. Id. § 25.1(g). Section 25.1(g) states:
In order to achieve the objective of assisting judicial officers in preserving the
integrity and impartiality of the judicial system through the prevention of bias,
all judicial officers should receive education on fairness. The education should
include the following subjects: race/ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation,
persons with disabilities, and sexual harassment.
Id.
207. Id. § 25.6(f)(5)(g). Section 25.6(f)(5)(g) states:
In order to achieve the objective of assisting court employees in preserving the
integrity and impartiality of the judicial system through the prevention of bias,
all court employees should receive education on fairness as provided
in sections 25.6(d)(3), (e)(2), and (f)(3) of the Standards of Judicial
Administration. The training should include the following subjects:
race/ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, persons with disabilities, and sexual
harassment.
Id.
208. SOF Report, supra note 38.
209. In 1994, two local bar associations released publications addressing biased
treatment and discrimination directed at gay and lesbian attorneys by legal employers.
Bar Association of San Francisco, Manual of Model Policies and Programs to Achieve
Equality of Opportunity in the Legal Profession 67-81 (1994); L.A. Bar Report, supra
note 1. The L.A. Bar Report found that sexual orientation bias was widespread and
virulent in legal employment in Los Angeles County. LA. Bar Report, supra note 1, at
1. Among Los Angeles legal professionals surveyed, more than 50% believed that the
work environment is less hospitable for gay and lesbian attorneys than for non-gay
attorneys. Id. at (i). Specifically, many respondents perceived that sexual orientation
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because of its subject and scope. Past surveys of lesbians or gay men
and the law focused mainly on attorneys and legal employment, and
suffered from a relatively small response sample. Moreover, they
primarily reported on survey respondents' perceptions rather than their
experiences."'
As part of its mandate to ensure that all court users receive equal and
fair treatment, the Access and Fairness Advisory Committee monitored
discrimination negatively affected performance evaluations, promotions, career
advancement, benefits, and salary. Id. at (i)-(ii), 13-24.
In 1999, the Arizona Bar found that lesbians and gay men are substantially
disadvantaged as employees or participants in the justice system because of sexual
orientation bias. Gay & Lesbian Task Force, State Bar of Ariz., Report to the Board of
Governors 18 (Apr. 1999) [hereinafter Arizona Bar Report]. Almost one half of the
judges and lawyers surveyed (47%) heard disparaging remarks about lesbians or gay
men in the public areas of the courthouse, id., and 13% observed negative treatment by
judges in open court toward those perceived to be lesbians or gay men. Id. at 20.
Further, employment opportunities for lesbian or gay attorneys are reduced based on
sexual orientation. Judges and lawyers reported that some court personnel and court
participants preferred not to work with lesbian or gay lawyers. Id. at 20 (noting that 81A
of court personnel and 4% of litigants, jurors, and witnesses overheard indications of
such a preference).
The community-based survey also showed that the more contact lesbians or gay men
had with the Arizonajustice system, the more likely they were to witness discrimination
or experience a hostile environment based on sexual orientation. Id. at 27-28. We must
cautiously evaluate that statement, however. First, the Arizona Bar Report broadly
defined "justice system" to include attorneys, police, and probation and parole officers,
as well as other contacts with those persons not limited to the court or judicial context.
Id. at Appendix, Discrimination Survey, Questions 7-16. Second, the more contact an
individual had with the justice system, the more opportunity he or she had to observe
negative treatment based on sexual orientation. Id. at 22-23. The study did not attempt
to control for the number of contacts an individual might have had with that system.
Finally, many of the responses reported incidents of police harassment, seemingly
unrelated to respondents' experiences with the courts. Id. at 23-24 (Respondents'
comments).
210. Other bar association surveys studied gay and lesbian attorneys' employment
experiences. Bar Association of San Francisco, Creating an Environment Conducive
to Diversity A Guide for Legal Employers on Eliminating Sexual Orientation
Discrinination 67 (1991); The Committee on Lesbians and Gay Men in the Legal
Profession, Report on the Experience of Lesbians and Gay Men in the Legal Profession,
in 48 THE RECORD OF THE AS'N OF THE BAR OF TMe CIT OF N.Y. 843 (1993). Both of
these reports contained findings and conclusions consistent with the L.A. Bar Report.
L.A. Bar Report, supra note 1, at 3 n.17.
211. Arizona Bar Report, supra note 209, at 8-10 (stating that out of 87 judges
surveyed, 29% responded; 133 lawyers surveyed, 29% responded; 11 law professors
surveyed, 15% responded; 158 law students surveyed, 17% responded; 384 members of
the general community surveyed, not necessarily court users, 48% responded): LA.. Bar
Report, supra note 1, at 4 (approximating that out of 400 gay and non-gay attorneys in
L.A. County, 20% responded; while out of approximately 60 LA. County legal
employers, 17% responded).
sexual orientation issues related to access and fairness in the state
courts.2 The subcommittee drafted and disseminated two surveys, one
for gay and lesbian court users, and another for all court employees. The
subcommittee designed the court user survey to determine whether
lesbians or gay me23 experienced or observed bias, discrimination,
ridicule, or discomfort based on sexual orientation while using the
courts; whether they had positive experiences based on sexual
orientation; and whether they believed they were shown the same
treatment and respect as others. The survey requested information on
respondents' most recent contact with California courts, as well as one
other, significant contact since 1990.
In contrast to the lesbian or gay court user study, the subcommittee
designed and distributed the court employee survey regardless of sexual
orientation.214 The subcommittee created the survey to determine if
212. SOF Report, supra note 38, at 5. The subcommittee and consultants designed
the surveys to focus on the California court system, to obtain data from every part of the
state, and primarily to emphasize the respondents' direct experiences and observations as
opposed to solely their attitudes or beliefs. Id. at 5-11. Both surveys were anonymous,
an important precaution given the sensitivity of sexual orientation bias.
213. With the assistance of various national and local lesbian and gay advocacy and
service organizations, the subcommittee identified 2100 lesbian or gay court users.
Fifty-eight percent completed the survey for a total response of 1225 court users. Id. at
9. The large number of survey recipients and responses is statistically remarkable. Id. at
13.
Ninety percent of court user survey respondents were white men. Sixty-nine percent
were gay. Sixty-six percent lived in an urban area. Eighty-three percent had an
undergraduate or graduate degree. Forty-eight percent had an income of at least $60,000
a year. Sixty-one percent were selectively open about their sexual orientation, primarily
with family, friends, and at work. SOF Report, supra note 38, at 14-15. Most gay or
lesbian court users had relatively few contacts with the court system. Seventy percent
had only two to three contacts since 1990. Those contacts tended to be with a criminal
or civil court (73%). Further, nearly twice as many contacts were as a juror or potential
juror (60%), than as a participant, either a litigant or attorney (32%). Id. at 14. The
subcommittee analyzed survey results by demographics (i.e., sex, race, age, income,
education, and urbanicity of the court, urban, suburban or rural) and by the nature of the
court experience itself (i.e., reason for using the court, type of court, in-court or out-of-
courtroom contact). No significant differences appeared based on demographics,
socioeconomic level, or urbanicity. Major distinctions were a function of the court
users' experiences. Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 16.
214. It sent questionnaires to about 5500 California court employees around the
state, including court clerks, reporters, administrators, and attorneys. SOF Report, stupra
note 38, at 12. Of those, 1525 responded. Id.
Ninety-three percent of court employee respondents were white, heterosexual, married
women. Sixty-six percent earned less than $50,000 a year and had no college degree.
Ninety-eight percent were full-time, permanent court employees. The typical respondent
had worked for the courts for twelve years, seven in her current position, and was
employed as court clerk, clerical staff, or mediator. Most respondents participated in
court proceedings at least once a month, with almost 50% participating daily. Id. at 14.
The subcommittee analyzed court employee responses by sexual orientation, sex,
education, urbanicity of court, type of court, type of court appointment, and whether
respondents observed court daily or less than daily. Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at
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employees observed negative behaviors toward gay men or lesbians,
either in open court or in other work settings; if employees personally
experienced discrimination or negative actions, or heard negative
comments based on their actual or perceived sexual orientation; and if
employees believed that gay men and lesbians were shown equal
treatment and respect in the courts.2 ' The survey asked court employees
to base their responses2 6 on their experiences over the past year only."'
It is significant that the findings of the SOF Report are consistent with
the metaphor of a sign around the necks of lesbians and gay men which
permits their worse treatment. While most lesbian and gay court users
believed they were treated the same as everyone else and treated with
respect by those who knew their sexual orientation, ' 8 several contrary
10, 42-73. Except for sexual orientation, the survey found relatively few differences in
responses based on the other characteristics. Id. Out of 1525 court employee
respondents, 64 identified themselves as lesbians, gay men, or bisexuals. SOF Report,
supra note 38, at 12. Of those lesbian or gay court employees, over one-third were
totally "out" at work; over one-third were selectively "out" at work; over one-quarter
were not "out" at work at all. Id at 14. Court employee survey respondents were
considerably less likely to identify openly as lesbian or gay at work as compared to court
users, where 93% were totally out or selectively out in their respective workplaces
(although significantly, not in the court setting).
215. SOF Report, supra note 38, at 11-13.
216. The court employee survey generated an unusually high number of negative
responses to the survey itself-more than other Judicial Council employee surveys. Id.
at 13. For example, "I find it incredible, and as a taxpayer, I am offended, that money is
allowed to be spent on such a stupid survey. I can further assure you that, as a court
clerk, I have better things to do than keep track of extraneous remarks regarding gays
and lesbians." I& "I have received your survey on sexual orientation and found it to be
degrading and offensive.... I am sure the Judicial Council could find better use of the
talent, time and money that is being wasted on a minority of court personnel." Id. "I
decline to answer your survey as I feel it covers a matter that is not appropriate to talk
about in the work place." Id These negative responses underscore the survey results,
which indicate that court employees are unconcerned, and sometimes hostile, to sexual
orientation issues in the courts.
217. The period covered in the survey was fall 1997 through fall 1998. Dominic J.
Brewer & Maryann Jacobi Gray, First Draft- Perceptions of Sexual Orientation Fairness
in California Courts: Results from Two Sureys 8 (Sept. 1999).
218. In their most recent contact, 89.2% of respondents agreed somewhat or very
strongly with the statement, "As far as I could tell, I was treated the same as everyone
else," and 80.4% of respondents agreed somewhat or very strongly with the statement. "I
was treated with respect by those who knew my sexual orientation." In another recent.
significant contact with the courts, 74.5% of the same pool of respondents agreed
somewhat or very strongly with the statement, "As far as I could tell, I was treated the
same as everyone else," and 70.4% of respondents agreed somewhat or very strongly
with the statement, "I was treated with respect by those who knew my sexual
orientation." Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 25 tbl.10, 37 tbl.18,; SOF Report, supra
note 38, at 18.
patterns emerged from the survey data. Those patterns demonstrated
that a significant number of lesbian and gay court users and employees
in a variety of contexts had less favorable experiences and perceptions of
fairness.
The predominant pattern is the degradation in lesbian and gay court
users' experiences when sexual orientation became visible, either as a
topic in the court proceeding, or as a characteristic of the court users
themselves. We can see this deterioration in experiences when we
compare their most recent court contact to another significant, recent
experience with the courts. The survey results for respondents' most
recent court contact can be used to obtain a baseline for lesbian and gay
court users' treatment and perceptions of fairness with the California
courts.2 19
By focusing on the most recent experience, the survey drew on a
random sample of lesbian and gay court users' experiences, rather than
having respondents describe a court contact that they deemed
noteworthy, either negatively or positively. Moreover, that latest
contact overwhelmingly tended to be one in which sexual orientation
was not pertinent to the contact 22' and so was likely not to be unusual in
that regard. Finally, sixty percent of lesbian and gay court users' most
recent experiences concerned some manner of jury service, rather than
as a party, lawyer, or witness in the proceedings (44.2%).222
In contrast, the other, significant court contact predominantly involved
sexual orientation issues.223 Further, lesbian and gay court users more
actively participated in that court contact as a party, witness, or lawyer
(55.1%), as opposed to some form of jury service (22%).2" Although
still favorable, survey respondents' agreement with the statement, "As
far as I could tell, I was treated the same as everyone else," dropped
from 89.2% in the most recent contact to 74.5% in other contact.22'
Similarly, respondents' perception that people treated them respectfully
219. Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 7.
220. Id.
221. At least 81.4% of those court contacts did not involve sexual orientation issues.
SOF Report, supra note 38, at 8.
222. Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 17 tbl.5.
223. Lesbian and gay court users reported that the other contact focused on sexual
orientation issues 74.3% of the time. Those issues included adoption, parenting
involving lesbian or gay parents, hate crimes, family dissolutions involving lesbian or
gay family members, domestic violence, employment discrimination, wills and trusts,
and other issues directly related to sexual orientation. Id. at 29 tbl.14.
224. Id. at 28 tbl. 13. Additionally, the rank order of percentages of lesbian and gay
respondents' involvement in the two court contacts is very different. Lesbian and gay
court users' active participation ranks significantly higher in the other contact than in the
more recent one. Compare id. at 17 tbl.5, with id., at 28 tbl.13.
225. Id. at 25 tbl.10; id. at 37 tbl.18.
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fell from 80.4% to 70.4% during those two contacts. ' :. Since the survey
asked identical questions in both contexts, the difference is a function of
the nature and duration of these court experiences. -' Visibility of sexual
orientation, either as a topic within the court proceeding or as a
characteristic of the court users themselves, significantly affectsm
lesbian and gay court users' treatment and perceptions of fairness.
Accordingly, individuals who have merely casual contacts with the
courts (for example, paying a traffic ticket or being called for a jury
panel) may understandably have more favorable impressions!" than
those with more extended contacts or personal involvement. Those
limited contacts often end up being sexual orientation neutral events,1-3) a
quality often missing from lesbian and gay court users' more personally
involved court experiences. 3  Further, the more limited the court
contact, the less likely others learned of respondents' sexual orientation.
For example, "I reported for jury duty but the case was settled out of
court. I am openly gay but not outwardly gay, so it never came up.' '"7
226. Id.
227. See generally id. at 8 (making statement in the context of demographic
analysis of the data).
An alternative explanation is that the quality of lesbian and gay court users'
experiences has improved over time. While this explanation initially appears plausible,
it ignores the uncertainty of the actual timing of all respondents' court contacts. The
most recent court contact necessarily occurred before the other contact, and both contacts
must have taken place between January 1, 1990, and May, 1998. Id. at 5-11. Among
the total court user respondents, however, we cannot generalize about the timing of the
court contacts. Some respondents' most recent experiences might have occurred before
another respondent's "other, significant contact," and vice versa. Id. at 6-7.
228. The Judicial Council Report shows a high correlation between active
participation by lesbian and gay court users or the pertinence of sexual orientation as an
issue in a court experience and deterioration in the treatment and perceptions of lesbians
or gay men. While correlation is not causation, one might well view the survey
responses pairing more active participation and/or pertinence of sexual orientation to the
court contact with higher perceptions of unfairness and worse treatment as more than
mere coincidence.
229. For many respondents, these contacts were sexual orientation neutral events.
See, e.g., Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 19 ("My most recent contact involved paying
a traffic ticket. Everyone was very nice. No one noticed/asked my sexual orientation. It
did not and should not come up.").
230. "My last contact with the courts was to report for jury duty, where I sat for two
hours then we were all released. I never spoke to anyone." Survey Data, supra note 14,
at 6 (responses to question 16). In the most recent contact, at least 81.4 % did not
involve sexual orientation issues. SOF Report, supra note 38, at 8 (responses to question
19).
231. In the more actively participatory contact, 74.3% of those contacts involved
sexual orientation issues. Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 29 tbl.14.
232. Survey Data, supra note 14, at 6 (responses to question 16).
Consequently, the lesbian or gay label did not attach and could not affect
treatment. In contrast, when sexual orientation became an issue in the
court contact, 30% believed those who knew their sexual orientation did
not treat them with respect, and 39% believed their sexual orientation
was used to devalue their credibility. 3 Survey responses illustrate this
connection: "Defendant's lawyer... used my relationship and my
partner as object of focus to denigrate my loss and income claim and
create smoke and mirrors. That would not have been used in a non-gay
situation." "One defendant was a gay man suing an ex-lover-
snickers and comments from jury members."' 5 "Jury member suggested
that witness was gay and therefore his testimony could not be trusted. 'z6
"I was discredited as a witness because they said I was probably 'out at a
club or something' before I witnessed the accident." 237
Similarly, in the other, significant court contact when more lesbian
and gay court users participated actively as witnesses, parties, or
attorneys, 8 they also perceived the California courts as less fair."39
233. The survey found that 74.3% of respondents' other recent, significant contact
with the courts involved certain sexual orientation issues. Brewer & Gray, supra note
16, at 29 tNl. 14. In that contact, 25.5% of lesbian and gay court users believed they were
treated differently from everyone else, and 29.6% of lesbian and gay respondents felt
those who knew their sexual orientation did not treat them with respect. In that same
contact, 39% of lesbian and gay court users believed that their sexual orientation was
used to devalue their credibility. Id. at 37 tbl.18. See generally id. at 38 tbl.19 (mean
ratings). Compare the data for these same questions in respondents' most recent contact:
10.8%, 19.6%, and 13.6%, respectively. Id. at 25 tbl.10.
234. Survey Data, supra note 14, at 4.
235. Id. at 9.
236. Id. at 2.
237. Id. at 12.
238. Compare lesbian and gay court user survey respondents' most recent contact
with the California courts, which contact tended to be through jury service (60%), with a
different, recent contact with the courts, which contact tended to be when they were a
party, witness, or lawyer in the proceedings (55.1%, as compared with jury service
during that contact, 22.2%). Compare Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 17 tbl.5, with
id. at 28 tbl.13.
239. When more of them participated actively in a court contact, 25.5% of lesbian
and gay court users believed that they were treated differently from everyone else as far
as they could tell, whereas 10.8% of them believed they were treated differently in their
primarily jury service contact. Compare id. at 37 tbl.18, with id. at 25 tbl.10; compare
id. at 38 tbl.19, with id. at 26 tbl.1 1. "In a domestic abuse case, the judge did not ask me
the same questions she asked potential jurors regarding my relationship with my
companion or my experience with domestic abuse." Id. at 19. Similarly, in a court
contact in which they participated more actively, 29.6% of lesbian and gay court users
felt those who knew their sexual orientation did not treat them with respect; however, in
their primarily jury service contact, 19.6% of respondents felt that those who knew their
sexual orientation treated them disrespectfully. Compare id. at 37 tbl.18, with id. at 25
tbl.10; compare id. at 38 tbl.19, with id. at 26 tbl.ll. Finally, when more respondents
participated actively in a court contact, 37.7% of lesbian and gay court users agreed
somewhat or very strongly with the statement, "My sexual orientation was used to
devalue my credibility." In contrast, 13.6% of them agreed somewhat or very strongly
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Direct participants in a case reported more negative incidents than did
lesbian or gay court user respondents as a whole." '3 Their extended
contact and more active roles may have provided others with the
opportunity to learn their sexual orientation.!" Like James Dale's
experience in the Boy Scouts, once court users are perceived to be
lesbian or gay, that trait overshadows other aspects of their identity.
Thus, their added visibility as lesbians or gay men increases their
negative experiences and perceptions.
Beyond perceptions of fairness or equality, lesbian and gay court users
also felt unsafe within the California courts. Despite the relative
neutrality of their most recent court contact, ' 3 over one-fifth of all
lesbian and gay court users felt threatened based on their sexual
orientation 2 " However, the number of respondents who felt threatened
nearly doubled once sexual orientation became more sirnificant or more
of them participated actively in the court contact.28 Respondents'
characterization of perceived threats included: "I felt intimidated-
didn't want them [two clerks and a police officer observed by
Respondent while in line] to talk about me the way they were talking
with the statement, "My sexual orientation was used to devalue my credibility," in their
primarily jury service contact. Compare id. at 37 tbl.18, with id. at 25 tbl.10; compare
id. at38 tbl.19, with id. at26 tbl.11.
240. Fourteen percent of direct participants in a case reported ridicule compared to
12% for the entire sample of lesbian or gay respondents; 5.3% reported negative
comments about themselves versus 4.2% for the overall sample, and 8% of direct
participants reported negative actions compared to 6.4% overall. SOF Report, supra
note 38, at 17.
241. In that contact, 28.7% of lesbian and gay court users reported that someone
else disclosed their sexual orientation without respondents' approval, and 24.5% felt
compelled to state their sexual orientation against their will. Brewer & Gray, supra note
16, at 37 thl.18.
242. The same pattern exists in this finding as well: active court participation and/or
increased sexual orientation visibility of gay people in the proceedings corresponded to
an increased perception of threat.
243. Because the most recent court contact tended to be one in which sexual
orientation was not pertinent to the contact that response may be used as a relatively
neutral baseline for a comparison with the other, significant court contact. In fact, at
least 81.4% of those court contacts did not involve sexual orientation issues. SOF
Report, supra note 38, at 8 (responses to Question 19).
244. In their most recent contact with the California courts, 21.5% of lesbian and
gay court users agreed somewhat or very strongly with the statement, "I felt threatened
because of my sexual orientation." Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, tbl.10, at 25.
245. The survey found that 37.7% of lesbian and gay court users agreed somewhat
or very strongly with the statement, "I felt threatened because of my sexual orientation."
Id. at tbl.18, at 37.
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about other gays-kept my mouth shut." 6  "Death threats and name
calling. Not of me but of the lesbians directly involved in the case."24'
Consequently, if lesbian and gay sexual orientation overshadows other
aspects of the court users' identity and becomes a marker for unequal
treatment, we should expect to see sexual orientation coloring even those
proceedings in which it would otherwise not appear. The SOF Report
findings corroborate this hypothesis. Lesbian and gay court users
reported that their sexual orientation was raised as an issue almost as
often when it did not pertain to the proceedings as when it played a
relevant role in their case or in their reason for using the courts. " As in
Dale, lesbian and gay identity, once known, appears to shade all other
aspects of the court experience, even when it is irrelevant.
Unsurprisingly, any anti-gay comments, actions, or prejudices present
in the judicial system might surface when sexual orientation issues
become more important in the court proceeding. Although the same
level of anti-gay feeling might exist in other court experiences, it may
not become apparent unless sexual orientation plays a role in the
proceeding. Survey respondents' demographic profile reinforces this
inference. Because lesbian and gay survey respondents were
predominantly educated, relatively affluent, white males,249 we might
assume that those respondents would have the most sophistication and
ability to navigate through the judicial system. As a result, we would
expect them to have the most positive experiences and perceptions of the
court system. Additionally, since most lesbian and gay court users'
sexual orientation is not easily identifiable, we would expect more
negative experiences and unfairness when they become visible as non-
heterosexual. The survey data illustrate this correlation as well.
James Dale's Scouting experience also reflects this change from a
position of relative power to powerlessness. He turned from an
exemplary Scout to a pariah once the Scouts learned of his gay
identity."" Although Dale sanctioned the marginalization of gay people
246. Survey Data, supra note 14, at 12.
247. Id.
248. In their most recent contact, 15.3% of lesbian and gay court users agreed
somewhat or very strongly with the statement, "My sexual orientation was pertinent to
the court proceedings," and 11.2% of those same respondents agreed somewhat or very
strongly with the statement, "My sexual orientation was raised as an issue even though it
did not pertain to the case." Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 25 tbl.10. In another,
recent, significant contact with the courts, 38.2% of lesbian and gay court users agreed
somewhat or very strongly with the statement, "My sexual orientation was pertinent to
the court proceedings," and 35% of those same respondents agreed somewhat or very
strongly with the statement, "My sexual orientation was raised as an issue even though it
did not pertain to the case." Id. at 37 tbl.18.
249. Id. at 12; SOF Report, supra note 38, at 14.
250. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2449 (2000); id. at 2460
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through the First Amendment, such marginalization also occurs where
the law forbids it. Lesbian and gay visibility often transforms the way
others perceive gay people.!' Readers familiar with sexual orientation
bias in modem American society should find this connection neither
unexpected nor aberrant. Some have called anti-gay, animus the last
socially acceptable form of prejudice existing today." Indeed, fear of
negative consequences for being openly gay or lesbian is one reason
many persons remain in the closet. As one court user respondent
commented, "[Many homosexuals, unless self-identified as
homosexuals, are assumed to be heterosexuals.... Why do I prefer to
pass as heterosexual? To avoid mistreatment."'-"
Similarly, the Arizona Bar Report found that judges and lawyers
reported some court participants and personnel preferred not to work
with openly gay or lesbian attorneys. "- A significant number of gay and
non-gay lawyers in Los Angeles County believed that being openly gay
or lesbian would be harmful to an attorney's career.-" In fact, to return
to this Article's opening experiment, nearly one-half of all Los Angeles
survey respondents, regardless of sexual orientation or sex, believed that
simply discussing one's personal or family life in a manner that revealed
the sex of one's partner-an inconsequential matter for a non-gay
lawyer-would harm a gay attorney's career. "  Moreover, annual
nationwide juror polls routinely find that lesbians and gay men are
among the groups to whom jurors report they cannot be fair-three
times more likely for gay litigants than for African-Americans, Asians,
Hispanics, or Whites."7
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
251. E.g., id. at 2476 (Stevens, J. dissenting); LA. Bar Report, supra note 1, at 32:
Sahagun, supra note 191.
252. E.g., E.A. Harvey, The Last 'Acceptable' Prejudice: In an Increasingly
Tolerant World, Gay Teens Still Face Harassment and Social Isolation, SUNDAY NEWS.
May 21, 2000, at G1; Richard Williamson, Gay Exec Talks About 'Glass Ceiling,'
ROcKY MTN. NEvs, Nov. 11, 1999, at 4B.
253. Survey Data, supra note 14, at 8 (responses to question 16).
254. Arizona Bar Report, supra note 209, at 20.
255. LA. Bar Report, supra note 1, at 29-31.
256. Id. at 31.
257. Peter Aronson et al., Jurors: A Biased Lot, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 2, 1998, at Al
(reporting results of annual National Law Journal-Decision Quest 1998 Juror Outlook
Survey); Ben Schmitt, Poll: Jurors Would Buck Laws to Achieve Justice, FULTON
COUNTY (GA) DAILY REP., Nov. 16, 1998, at 12 (reporting results of 1998 National Law
Journal-Decision Quest 1998 Juror Outlook Survey: less than 5% of respondents said
they could not be fair to a Black or Hispanic litigant, 17% could not be fair to a lesbian
or gay litigant); Bob Van Voris, Voir Dire Tip: Pick Former Juror, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 1,
Finally, many comments received in response to the dissemination of
the court employee survey demonstrate that some California court
employees are, at best, indifferent and, at worst, hostile to sexual
orientation fairness in the court system.28 Lesbian and gay court users'
treatment in the courts is consonant with these other items. Overall,
56% of gay and lesbian court users in a contact where sexual orientation
became significant reported observing or experiencing a range of
negative experiences directed toward themselves or other gays and
lesbians.29 Specifically, 36% heard negative comments about someone
else, and 23% heard negative comments about themselves. Of
respondents, 29% heard negative remarks arising from a case; 26%
experienced or heard ridicule, snickering, or jokes about lesbians and/or
gay men; and 25% heard other negative remarks."
Open-ended responses illustrated these findings. "A jury member
suggested that witness was gay and therefore his testimony could not be
trusted." "Two attorneys in the hall outside of courtroom were talking.
One said, 'did you see that?' This was followed by a joke, then
laughing. Bailiff joined attorneys briefly-all laughed.'
Additionally, the court employee survey supports and corroborates
court users' experiences, particularly for ridicule, snickering, or jokes.
One out of every five court employee respondents heard derogatory
terms, ridicule, snickering, or jokes about gay men or lesbians in open
court, with judges, lawyers, or court employees most frequently making
those comments. 262
In the baseline contact, lesbian and gay court users who had an in-
court experience saw and heard significantly more negative comments
and actions than did those with non-courtroom experiences."3 Court
1999, at Al, available at http://www.nlj.com/l1999/juryllOl/ (discussing 1999 Juror
Outlook Survey results: 3% of respondents said they could not be fair if a litigant were
Black, Asian, American Indian, or White; 4% for Hispanic litigants; 12% if the party
were a lesbian or gay man). The 1999 data show that among respondents over the age of
65, 20.4% stated they could not be fair to a lesbian or gay litigant. Id.
258. See supra note 216; see also Brewer & Gray, supra note 217, at 9; SOF
Report, supra note 38, at 13. The 1999 data show that among respondents over the age
of 65, 20.4% stated they could not be fair to a lesbian or gay litigant. Van Voris, supra
note 257; LA. Bar Report, supra note 1, at 43-44 (quoting comments received by the
L.A. Committee on Sexual Orientation Bias in response to its survey). Those comments
are strikingly similar to those the Subcommittee on Sexual Orientation Fairness received
to its survey.
259. Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 33 tbl.16.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 19 (emphasis in original).
262. Id. at 52 tbl.29. The Arizona Bar Report contains similar findings about
disparaging comments in the courthouse, Arizona Bar Report, supra note 209, at 18, and
negative treatment of lesbians or gay men in court, id. at 20.
263. Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 22 tbl.8. For example, 12% of gay men and
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employees, however, observed more negative comments or actions
against lesbians or gay men outside the courtroom. ' Court employees'
greater access to the non-public, non-courtroom areas may explain the
difference between court employees' and court users' observations.
Regardless of location, these experiences are more striking because the
California Canons of Judicial Ethics require judges to refrain from
negative behavior toward lesbian or gay court users, and also mandate
that they address others' behaviors and comments within their
courtrooms.26' Despite these legal protections, lesbians and gay men still
experienced a significant amount of negative actions and comments.
Some respondents noted, "I was a jury prospect but it was evident that
the defense lawyer didn't want gays on the jury. One of his questions to
me during selection was: Mr. X, would you say you have more straight
friends or gay friends? I was discharged."" "Gay group home
counselor was looked upon with less respect than that normally accorded
such counselors in juvenile delinquency cases. ' 7:67
Lesbian and gay court users also reported a small number of positive
comments and actions.2' The subcommittee inquired about positive
lesbian court users observed or experienced ridicule, snickering, or jokes about lesbians
and/or gay men; 8% heard negative comments about someone else; 4% heard negative
comments about themselves; 5% heard negative remarks arising from a case; 8% heard
other negative remarks; and 6% had a negative action taken against them. Id. at 21 tbl.7.
264. Id. at 55 tbl.34. Of court employees, 30% heard ridicule snickering, or jokes
about lesbians and gay men in settings other than open court; 28% reported hearing
negative comments; and 20% heard derogatory terms about gay men or lesbians. Id. A
significant number of court employees observed negative actions or comments by
judges, lawyers, or court employees in work settings other than open court in the year
before the survey. Over 17% reported hearing ridicule, snickering, or jokes one to three
times, 6% heard ridicule, snickering, or jokes four to six times, and 9% of respondents
heard or observed ridicule, snickering, or jokes about lesbians or gay men more that six
times. This frequency was similar with respect to negative comments, with 16% of
employees hearing negative comments about gay men or lesbians one to three times, 6%
hearing such comments four to six times, and 6% hearing negative comments more than
six times. IL
265. CAL. R. COURT, CODE OFJUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 3B(6) (Daily Journal 2000).
266. Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 19.
267. Brewer & Gray, supra note 217, at 34.
268. In the more active contact, 14% of gay and lesbian court users heard or
observed positive comments or actions about themselves, and 9% heard comments about
other lesbians or gay men; 7% saw positive actions toward someone else. Brewer &
Gray, supra note 16, at 34 thl.17. That percentage dropped to 3% for positive comments
and 2% for positive actions toward themselves outside the courtroom, and 2% for
positive comments and 1% for positive actions toward others. Id. at 23 tbl.9. Although
the occurrences of positive comments or actions are relatively small, when occurring in
the courtroom, 52% of the time, lawyers made those positive comments and 30% of the
events in order not to slant or color respondents' answers toward only
negative court experiences and to elicit a more accurate picture of their
court contacts.26 Negative comments outweighed positive comments in
the courtroom by almost four to one. In the most recent contact, fewer
than 3% of all respondents answered affirmatively to any of the
questions about positive comments or actions.270 Thus, even though gay
and lesbian court users had those experiences, the negative comments
and actions overwhelmed the positive, and may explain some of the bias
gay and lesbian court users perceived when participating in court.
Perhaps as interesting as the few positive comments and actions is use
of "positive" to refer to those particular court users' experiences. What
respondents labeled "positive" is not truly the opposite of "negative."
No lesbian or gay court users reported being treated better than others
because of their sexual orientation. Rather, the open-ended survey
responses show that positive comments or actions tended to be those in
which gay and lesbian court users were treated with equal respect and
fairness. Positive experiences included situations where the judge may
have expressed support during a second parent adoption 7' or, in another
instance, a survey respondent noted, "The judge and lawyer made a
point of notifying my ex that sexual orientation is not an issue in family
law. 2'72 Lesbian and gay court users must have expected hostility or
disrespect from the court system in order to label equal or respectful
treatment "positive." The data demonstrate that those low expectations
were often accurate.
Indeed, the data reflect court users' and court employees' negative
experiences and perceptions of bias or unfairness in the judicial system.
The survey asked court users and court employees the same questions on
fair treatment, access, and availability.273 Fifty percent of lesbian and
gay court users believed that the courts are not providing fair and
unbiased treatment for lesbians or gay men.27 Further, 24% of lesbian
time judges did. Id. at 34 tbl.17. Outside the courtroom, 40% of the time, judges made
those positive comments and lawyers 40% of the time. Court employees made positive
comments about 17% of the time both inside and outside the courtroom. Id. at 23 tbl.9.
269. Author's recollection of survey drafting discussions in 1997 meetings of the
Sexual Orientation Subcommittee; see also SOF Report, supra note 38, at 17 (defining
"positive comments and actions").
270. Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 19; see also id. at 23 tbl.9. Compare these
numbers to the other, significant contact, in which fewer than 15% of lesbian and gay
court users had positive actions or comments. Id. at 34 tbl. 17.
271. Id. at32.
272. Id. at 20.
273. Brewer & Gray, Survey questions, reprinted in Appendix to SOF Report, supra
note 38. Compare pp. 16-17 (Court User's Survey), with p. 17 (Court Employee
Survey).
274. In all their California court contacts, 50.2% of lesbian and gay survey
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and gay court users believed the courts were unsuccessful on all of the
following measures: being available to resolve disputes involving
lesbians or gay men, being open or accessible to lesbians or gay men,
providing fair and unbiased treatment of lesbians or gay men.-' g
Non-gay court employees and lesbian or gay employees have
strikingly different attitudes from each other, and from lesbian and gay
court users, about the courts' success in providing access and fairness.
Non-gay court employees generally had more favorable perceptions of
the judicial system's fairness than did lesbian and gay court
employees.' 6 Moreover, when asked about the courts' success treating
lesbians and gay men fairly, both gay and non-gay court employees gave
higher ratings than did lesbian and gay court users."
respondents rated the courts somewhat or very unsuccessful in providing fair and
unbiased treatment for lesbians and gay men. Similarly, on a 1 to 10 scale, they gave the
courts a mean rating of 5.23 for fairness to lesbians and gay men and 6.50 for fairness to
people in general. (Higher scores indicate a higher level of fairness.) Brewer & Gray.
supra note 16, at 39 tbl.21.
275. In all their California court contacts, 28.9% of lesbian and gay court users
rated the courts somewhat or very unsuccessful in providing access for lesbians and gay
men, and 71.9% rated the courts somewhat or very successful. In those same contacts.
44.9% of respondents rated the courts somewhat or very unsuccessful in being available
to resolve disputes involving lesbians and gay men; 55.1% rated the courts somewhat or
very successful. The distinction between the California court's openness and
accessibility to lesbians or gay men and the courts' availability to resolve disputes
involving lesbians or gay men was designed to explore the distinction between formal
access or comfort with the judicial process and the availability of substantive legal
doctrine or court officers to include lesbians or gay men's issues. However, it is possible
that survey respondents defined "access" and "availability" differently. Id. at 36, n.3.
Of lesbian and gay court users, 24% believed the courts were neither somewhat nor very
successful on any of the three dimensions (fair treatment, access, and availability). Id. at
39 tbl.21.
276. On a 4-point scale with the higher scores indicating a higher degree of fairness.
heterosexual employees gave the court a mean score of 3.33, while lesbians and gay
male court employees gave the court a score of 2.83 with respect to the courts' success in
providing access for lesbians and gay men. Regarding the courts' availability to resolve
disputes involving gay men and lesbians, heterosexual employees gave the courts a mean
score of 3.19 compared to lesbians and gay male employees' score of 2.67. Id. at 72
tbl.52.
277. Employees rated the courts a 3.29 compared to users' rating of 2.42 on a 4-
point scale with higher scores indicating a higher degree of fairness. Id. at 39 tbl.21; id.
at 72 tbl.52. With respect to the courts' success in providing access for lesbians and gay
men, lesbian and gay users gave the courts a mean rating of 2.79; lesbian and gay
employees gave the courts a mean rating of 2.83, while heterosexual employees gave the
courts a mean rating of 3.33. Regarding the courts' availability to resolve disputes
involving gay men and lesbians, lesbian and gay users gave the courts a mean rating of
2.50, lesbian and gay employees gave the courts a mean rating of 2.54, heterosexual
employees gave the courts a mean rating of 3.19. Id. at 39 tbl.21; id. at 72 tbl.52.
Additionally, the correlation between lesbian and gay visibility and
negative experiences applies to court employees as well as court users.
The SOF Report found a significant disparity in the personal work
experiences of gay and lesbian versus heterosexual employees. Lesbian
and gay employees were over five times more likely to experience
negative actions or discrimination, or to hear comments based on sexual
orientation than were heterosexual employees." 8 Further, if only 36.1%
of the self-identified gay or lesbian employees were completely out to
their co-workers,279 logically this more visible group should have
experienced more discrimination than the 63.9% of lesbian or gay
employees who hid their sexual orientation to some degree280 or who
were heterosexual. One court employee stated, "There were quite a few
gay men who worked at our court and were openly harassed because of
it.""' One gay employee noted, "I've heard derisive references such as
'faggot' from judges, co-workers, and bailiffs. Questions have been
asked of me [regarding] flowers/gardening and other areas where gay
men are stereotyped. '' 2  Another employee reported, "When helping
lesbians or gays some of the clerks handle their paperwork touching only
the tips or edges of the paper. One stated, 'You never know what they
did or touched."
283
The distinctiveness of lesbian and gay identity underlying Dale helps
explain these findings. More specifically, we do not have a separate
schema for non-gay people; they are just "people" and not a group
characterized by their sexual behavior.2' Accordingly, we rarely
278. While 3.4% of non-gay court employees reported hearing negative comments
based on their sexual orientation in the last year, 20.4% of lesbian and gay court
employees reported hearing such comments. Just 3.2% of non-gay employees reported
their sexual orientation being the subject of jokes or ridicule, while 16.2% of lesbian and
gay employees reported such incidents; only 2% of non-gay employees reported verbal
abuse based on their own sexual orientation, while 12.5% of lesbian and gay court
employees reported such abuse. Id. at 62 tbl.40. Similarly, 2.5% of non-gay employees
reported experiencing negative actions based on sexual orientation, compared with
almost 15.7% of lesbian and gay male employees. Finally, 12.9% of lesbian and gay
employees report being called derogatory names based on their own sexual orientation,
compared with 1.7% of non-gay employees. Id. Finally, one in five lesbian and gay
employees reported experiencing discrimination (as opposed to only negative comments
or actions) at their workplace based on their sexual orientation. Merely 2% of the non-
gay employees reported being discriminated against based on sexual orientation. Id.
279. Id. at 44 tbl.24.
280. Id.
281. Id. at48.
282. Id. at 49.
283. Id.
284. Some segments of the gay community use the term "breeder" to refer to all
non-gay persons. E.g., Rob Morse, We're Here, We're Having Beer.. ., S.F. EXAMINER,
June 29, 1997, at A2; see also Barbara Brotman, Gay or Straight, Readers Lust for
'Savage Love', CHICAGO TRIB., Nov. 21, 1996, at 1; Rich Kane, A OHell, Can a Gay Man
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perceive the sexual orientation of non-gay persons because we measure
difference against that baseline.r For example, sexual orientation
protections apply to gay and non-gay persons alike, but we usually do
not notice that symmetry.26 Non-gay people appear not to need that
protection7 because they do not appear different enough to provoke a
negative reaction. Unsurprisingly, few non-gay court employees
suffered negative treatment because of their sexual orientation.
The SOF Report demonstrates the strong incentives for a lesbian or
gay court employee to remain closeted. Specifically, 57.9% of all court
employees believe it is better if gay men and lesbians are not open about
their sexual orientation, and 29.5% of employees believe that being
openly gay or lesbian is unsafe. If a person is suspected of being lesbian
or gay, 17.3% of court employees stated that it is harder to be hired;
13.4% agreed that sexual orientation is used to devalue the credibility of
some gay or lesbian employees, and 9.8% believed that anti-gay
prejudice is widespread at work. Moreover, 40.4% acknowledge that
people make jokes or comments about gay people behind their backs.'
Find Love Online?, OC WKLY. (Orange County, Cal.), Apr. 4, 1997, at 8: Michael J.
Ybarra, Odd Man In, L.A. TMIES, Mar. 31, 1997, at El. The rhetorical impact of that
term illustrates the pejorative, misleading, and stigmatizing effect of a view that reduces
people to one facet of their assumed sexual activity.
285. Indeed, the word "heterosexual" did not come into the language until preceded
by, and perhaps in contradistinction to, "homosexual." David M. Halperin, Ser Before
Sexuality: Pederasty, Politics, and Power in Classical Athens, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY:
RECLAIMING THE GAY AND LESBIAN PAST 37, 37-39 (Martin Bauml Duberman et al. eds.,
1989).
286. Justice Scalia's dissent in Roiner provides a striking example of this inattention
in his description of Colorado's Amendment 2 as merely banning special rights for gay
people and returning Colorado law to neutrality. Romer v. Evans 517 U.S. 620, 638-39
(Scalia, J., dissenting). On a purely descriptive level, he misstates the effect of the
Colorado law. Each of the ordinances affected by the amendment, e.g.. Aspen. Boulder,
Denver, and the state Executive Order, barred discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. Id. at 623-24, 626-27 (quoting Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270. 1284-85
(Colo. 1993) (en banc)). Amendment 2 prohibited antidiscrimination provisions based
on homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation only. Id. at 624 (citing COLO. CONST.
art. IL § 30b). Thus, heterosexuals, as heterosexuals, would have remained protected
against discrimination under these ordinances; gay people would not have been
protected.
287. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 63 1.
288. But see Susan Ferriss & Erin McCormick, When a Kiss Isn't Just a Kiss, S.F.
EXAmiER, Mar. 9, 1997, at Al (reporting that after a gay bar owner ejected a man and
woman for kissing, S.F. Human Rights Commission ordered gay bar to change anti-
heterosexual kissing policy to comply with sexual orientation discrimination
prohibitions).
289. Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 69 tblA8.
Additionally, when the gay or lesbian employee becomes more
visible, employees believe that workplace policies are applied less fairly.
For example, "I could never understand why all of a sudden I was being
treated with disrespect by management. Then a co-worker told me that
she thought management hated gays and that they were told by a
different co-worker that I was gay."2'' People expect lesbian and gay
employees to remain closeted about their sexual orientation or risk
suffering discrimination.29' Other court employees report feeling
invisible or being shunned by co-workers after they complained about
different treatment of gay people.29 Most telling of all, some employees
did not report incidents of anti-gay behavior because they feared others
would think they were lesbian or gay.2 93 Thus, some lesbian or gay court
employees would rather remain closeted than report incidents of abuse,
and some non-gay employees may have chosen to keep silent rather than
risk that identification.
The most direct evidence of the stigmatizing effects in the courts of
open lesbian or gay identity appears in the SOF Report's specific
findings on disclosure of sexual orientation and responses to requests for
personal information. Because being an openly lesbian or gay man
involves a continuing series of choices about disclosure, even otherwise
openly gay people may be inhibited about revealing their sexual
orientation in the courts. "One man in particular made gestures and anti-
gay comments. Others would nod in agreement it was very scary to
come out in that environment. [sic] The judge did dismiss this man
after a while."2" For example, one court user noted that attorney,
witness, and court audience stated that a gay man "asked for it" by being
OUt. 295 At least one court user respondent specifically reported that he or
290. Id. at 59; L.A. Bar Report, supra note 1, at 16, 19 (discussing evaluations,
promotions, and career paths for openly gay or lesbian attorneys).
291. Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 69 tbl.48; id. at 70 tbl.49.
292. Id. at 60. Employees noted: "It's like I don't exist anymore," and "Made me
feel uncomfortable. Fewer invitations to group lunches, etc." Id. See generally L.A.
Bar Report, supra note 1, at 32 (discussing the choice of confronting or acquiescing in
anti-gay behaviors).
293. The survey found that 7.1% of court employees, who experienced incidents of
negative behaviors at work and did not report them, did not do so because of this fear.
Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 64 tbl.43. Second, 2.8% of employees, who observed
such treatment in open court, did not report it for this reason. Id. at 54 tbl.33. Finally,
2.3% of employees, who observed such behavior other than in open court, did not report
it for this reason. Id. at 58 tbl.38.
294. Brewer & Gray, supra note 217, at 19.
295. Survey Data, supra note 14, at 9. The idea that openly gay people deserve
negative treatment is a common occurrence. E.g., Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446,
451 (7th Cir. 1996). In Nabozny, after a mock rape by male students, a gay middle
school boy fled to his principal's office. Id. The principal's response was "that 'boys
will be boys' and told [the complaining student] that if he was 'going to be so openly
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she passed as heterosexual rather than be subjected to mistreatment as
gay or lesbian.2
Therefore, we might expect some disparity between their openness in
court and in other settings. Fifty-six percent of gay and lesbian court
users did not want to state their sexual orientation during their court
contact,2 ' although most of these court users were openly gay or lesbian
in other contexts. Over ninety percent were totally or selectively open at
work, to family, to friends, and within the community." This finding
undermines the assumption in Dale that a gay man, open in one setting,
is open in all. The size of the disparity in openness between the judicial
system and other settings may reflect that lesbian and gay court users'
experiences are far from ideal, despite their legal protections in the
courts. The Court's First Amendment doctrine provides additional
pressures to remain closeted, since their openness in court may affect
their ability to participate in private organizations.
Further, choosing whether and how to reveal one's sexual orientation
is very different from being forced to disclose it or having someone else
do so.z" Given the increased likelihood of negative consequences that
gay,' he should 'expect' such behavior from his fellow students." Id.; see also Bradley,
supra note 31 (discussing the murder of gay soldier).
Mr. JAVIER TORRES: Here is someone else, a y-another soldier, in the
same position that I am, and he was gay and he got murdered over that fact.
When I heard it, inside I was scared, I was shocked. But on the outside I
pretended to be, like, "Cool. No big deal. Just a fag, you know." And-and
that was the part that hurt the most, because here I am gay. I-I mean.
obviously I was scared. I was fearful of my own life.
BRADLEY: What-what did the-the other guys say after Barry
Winchell was murdered?
Mr. TORRES: There was some who was, like, "Hey, it's just one less fag
to deal with. I mean, they don't really belong here anyways. You know, I
mean, it's their fault for putting themselves in that position. They should know
better."
296. Survey Data, supra note 14, at 8; LA. Bar Report, supra note 1, at 27 ("[Mlost
gay attorneys attempt to avoid unlawful discrimination by leaving their sexuality
ambiguous, or even making it appear mainstream."); id. at 27 n.179 (reporting that one
lesbian lawyer married in order to make partner).
297. The survey found that 59.7% of lesbian and gay court users did not want to
state their sexual orientation during their most recent contact with the California courts.
Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 25 tbl.10. Further, 55.6% of lesbian and gay court
users did not want to state their sexual orientation during another significant recent
contact with the California courts. Id. at 37 tbl.18.
298. The survey found that 92.8% were open at work, 94.6% to family, 99.4% to
friends, and 91.5% within their community. Id. at 14 tbl.2.
299. Commentators have discussed extensively the controversial practice of
attach to being an open lesbian or gay court user, the loss of control over
that identity decision can produce a significant amount of anxiety."
Thus, it is important that almost one in four lesbian or gay court users
believed that someone else disclosed their sexual orientation without
their approval in a court contact involving sexual orientation issues."'
Further, in that same setting, nearly an equal number felt forced to state
their sexual orientation against their will.'3 2 Even in the most recent
contact with the California courts, when sexual orientation became an
issue, twice as many persons observed at least one negative incident. 3
Moreover, when respondents' sexual orientation was revealed in that
setting, nearly three times as many respondents reported at least one
negative incident than when their lesbian or gay identity was not
uncovered.304
Despite their willingness, or lack thereof, to disclose this personal
information, in their baseline contact, a few lesbian and gay court users
were asked direct questions about their sexual orientation. 30' Lawyers
predominantly asked these questions and always in court.3° In the other,
significant contact, in which more respondents participated actively in
the proceedings, however, over one in five lesbian and gay court users
"outing"-disclosing the sexual orientation of closeted lesbian or gay politicians or
celebrities without their permission, particularly those who have taken anti-gay actions.
See generally LARRY GROSS, CONTESTED CLOSETS: THE POLITICS AND ETHICS OF OUTING
(1993); MICHELANGELO SIGNORILE, QUEER IN AMERICA: SEX, THE MEDIA, AND THE
CLOSETS OF POWER 70-77 (1993); Jon E. Grant, Note, "Outing" and Freedom of the
Press: Sexual Orientation's Challenge to the Supreme Court's Categorical
Jurisprudence, 77 CORNELL L. RaV. 103 (1991) (discussing outing and First Amendment
concerns); Mathieu J. Shapiro, Note, When Is a Conflict Really a Conflict? Outing and
the Law, 36 B.C. L. REv. 587 (1995).
300. For an extreme example of the stress that forced disclosure brings, see Robert
Sallady, Davis, Lawmakers Fight over Parole for Model Inmate, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., May 3, 2000, at A3 (discussing parole in the case of Robert Rosenkrantz, who was
so distraught over the unconsented disclosure of his homosexuality that he killed the
person who revealed the information).
301. Of lesbian and gay court users, 28.7% reported that someone else stated their
sexual orientation without their approval. Compare Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 37
tbl.18, with id. at 25 tbl.10 (noting 8.6% during their most recent contact with the
California courts).
302. Of lesbian and gay court users, 24.5% reported they felt compelled to state
their sexual orientation against their will. Compare id. at 37 tbl. 18, with id. at 25 tbl. 10
(noting 10.5% during their most recent contact with the California courts).
303. In their most recent contact with the California courts, just under 25% of the
contacts involved sexual orientation issues. Of those contacts, almost 30% observed at
least one negative incident versus 14% in the remaining cases. Id. at 18.
304. In the 15% of contacts in which respondents' sexual orientation was revealed,
42% reported at least one negative incident compared to 14% reporting any negative
incident where sexual orientation identity was not disclosed. Id. at 17-18.
305. Of respondents, 3% were asked directly about their sexual orientation. Id. at
17 tbl.6.
306. Id. at 15-16.
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were asked to indicate their sexual orientation.""" Once again, three-
quarters reported that a lawyer asked that question."
The significance of these findings increases because lesbian and gay
court users reported that sexual orientation became an issue in court
when it was not pertinent almost as often as when it was pertinent."':
Apparently, lawyers sometimes used lesbian or gay identity as a
litigation strategy. An open response from one respondent illustrates the
tactical use of identity: "[A lawyer] questioned potential jurors about
whether they would accept unbiased testimony from gay witnesses. The
manner of question implied gays were unreliable witnesses, thus placing
a bias in the minds of potential jurors."10 This strategy resonates with
some jurors' negative perceptions of lesbians and gay men."'
Accordingly, even otherwise openly gay or lesbian court users might be
reluctant to disclose their sexual orientation in the California courts.
The closeting effects felt by lesbian and gay court users might also
stem from general inattention to the diversity of their lives'" and from
307. Of respondents, 20.4% were asked their sexual orientation directly. Id. at 30
tbl.15.
308. It. at 30.
309. SOF Report, supra note 38, Finding 16, at 20.
310. Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 31. Other respondents reported that lawyers
dismissed gay or lesbian persons from the jury after those individuals disclosed their
sexual orientation. Survey Data, supra note 14, at 8-9 (responses to question 18).
On June 27, 2000, California Governor Gray Davis signed Assembly Bill 2418
into law. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Davis Signs Legislation
to Protect Californians from Discrimination in Jun' Selection (June 27, 2000). at http://
www.governor.ca.gov/briefingpressreleases/jun0O/100029627.html. That legislation
added sexual orientation as a prohibited category for exclusion during peremptory
challenges during jury selection, and for jury service exemption. Id. Although this law,
gives lesbians or gay men protections unavailable at the time of the survey, the suney
data reflect that legal doctrine and actual treatment of lesbians or gay men often diverge.
311. Aronson et al., supra note 257, at A6.
312. The California Standards of Judicial Administration attempt to address the
diverse lives of lesbians or gay men in the standard jury questions for judges.
It may appear that one or more of the parties, attorneys or witnesses come from
a particular national, racial or religious group (or may have a life style different
than your own). Would this is any way affect your judgment or the weight and
credibility you would give to their testimony?
CAL. R. COURT, STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. § 8(c)( 16) (Daily Journal 2000): id. at
§ 8.5(b)(18).
Although not specifically mentioning lesbians or gay men, the use of "'lifestyles"
rather than "lives" when referring to gay people is problematic. The term connotes a
conscious and socially unacceptable choice, and not merely another manner of living.
Tellingly, before the Supreme Court's decision in Palmore v. Sidoti. 466 U.S. 429
(1984), courts had once described interracial marriages as a "lifestyle' to create the same
marginalizing effect. d at 431 (lower court changed custody from the mother because
negative treatment or a hostile court environment. In their most recent
court experience, 44% of gay men and lesbians were jurors or venire
panelists."3 In that contact, 48.3% were asked if they were married."'
Overall, 26% of all lesbian or gay court users were asked if they were
married. The California Judicial Council recommends that judges
request marital status during standard voir dire questioning.'" Many
respondents felt they could only reply incompletely or inadequately to
that query.
The judge asked all prospective jurors to state marital status and what their
spouse's occupation was. I have a long-term domestic partner, so I felt that
answering the question honestly required me to reveal my sexual orientation
and to state my partner's occupation even though legally my marital status is
single. Stating 'single' would have felt like lying)'
6
The marital status question reinforces the assumption that individuals
are heterosexual and either married or single) 7 Thus, the question may
create the perception of bias or foster a feeling of invisibility in anyone
whose life cannot be described by those categories.
Inquiring about marital status, unless it is specifically relevant to a
case, may undermine the credibility of the judicial process in several
the "wife... has chosen for herself and for her child, a life-style unacceptable tG the
father and to society"). The strangeness to modem ears of the word "lifestyle" as applied
to interracial marriage shows how the view of marriage has changed in a quarter century.
Brower, supra note 3, at 79-82 (discussing Palmore and same-sex relationships). That it
does not sound equally strange when applied to lesbians and gay men illustrates the
ingrained nature of the view that lesbians or gay men are so different from the rest of
society that they do not share a common life and goals with non-gay people, albeit with
variations in the sex of their life and sex partners. This segregationist view is an error.
In short, like their non-gay counterparts, lesbians and gay men have lives, not lifestyles.
313. The survey found that 44% of gay men and lesbians participated either as a
juror or in jury voir dire. Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 17 tbl.5.
314. Id. at 16. The survey found that 26.1% of all lesbian or gay court users were
asked if they were married. Id. at 16 tbl.6. In contrast, only 6.8% were asked if they had
a domestic partner. Id. at 17 tbl.6. Some respondents were uncomfortable with that
question as well. "I did not tell the truth about having a partner because I was not
comfortable being 'out' in that setting. I pretended I was single-then 'passed' for
heterosexual. I did not want my partner 'outed'-they asked name and profession of
spouse or significant other." Survey Data, supra note 14, at 21.
315. CAL. R. COURT, STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. § 8(c)(20) (Daily Journal
2000) ("Each of you should now state your name, where you live, your marital status
(whether married, single, widowed or divorced) .... If you are married, you should also
briefly describe your spouse's occupational history and present employer, if any."); id. §
8(d)(28) (raising the same question); id. § 8.5(b)(20) (raising the same question); id. §
8(d)(9) ("Have you, or your spouse, ever been engaged in any phase of the real estate
business ....").
316. Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 20.
317. The assumption that one is married or single is in the traditional heterosexual
sense; even Vermont uses the term "civil union" for same-sex couples, and not marriage.
Carey Goldberg, Gay and Lesbian Couples Head for Vermont to Make It Legal, but How
Legal Is It?, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2000, at 12.
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ways. First, it deprives the court and the lawyers of valuable
information about relationships necessary or useful for a fair jury
selection or court process. One respondent stated, "In a domestic abuse
case, the judge did not ask me the same questions she asked other
potential jurors regarding my relationship with my companion or my
experience with domestic abuse. ''15
Second, it forces gay or lesbian jurors or witnesses to either disclose
their sexual orientation or answer the question narrowly according to its
specific terms, leaving them to deny or be incomplete about their lives.
As one survey respondent noted: "All prospective jurors were asked
about marital status. I have been in a monogamous relationship 33 years
and consider myself married. It would have been wrong to deny my
relationship but it would have been legal to do so. It would have been a
very public 'outing' !,3
Third, it may foster a perception among gay and lesbian court users
that their subsequent judicial experience may not be fully informed or
fair. "I feel that the court does not take sexual orientation seriously and
excludes it as an issue, which may be a mistake under certain
circumstances-assuming everyone is either single or married."'"
"Lawyers questioned jurors about relevant medical conditions of spouses
and family with disregard for other relationships of gays, lesbians, and
domestic partners. Judge did not clarify the lawyer's intent. The net
effect: Our relationships don't count."2'
The California SOF Report empirically confirms some elements of
Dale's analysis, and contradicts others. The SOF Report illustrated that
the Court erroneously viewed being openly gay or lesbian as a one-step,
all-or-nothing process. There are many pressures on gay people to
remain closeted, from negative consequences of being open to
assumptions of heterosexuality and lack of sensitivity to the realities of
lesbian and gay lives. Moreover, gay men and women must
affirmatively communicate their identity to be visible, a decision that
many do not take lightly. Thus, even otherwise open lesbians or gay
men are not out in all settings. Consequently, the Court erroneously
318. Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 20. See also Survey Data. supra note 14. at
14 (quoting response to question 36: "1 was serving jury duty. Questions asked of
straight jurors were not asked of me. Things that excluded 'married' people were not
applied to gay/lesbian even with long time partners.").
319. Survey Data, supra note 14, at 14 (response to question 36).
320. Id. at 16 (response to question 36).
321. Brewer & Gray, supra note 217, at 20.
assumed that because Dale was out at college, he would be open in
Scouting.
Additionally, as responses to any survey question demonstrated, even
a relatively homogeneous group of lesbians and gay men holds diverse
views. Their shared identity does not provide a monolithic opinion on
any topic. Thus, the Court mistook Dale's gay identity for his
substantive views on Scouting policy. The SOF Report also showed that
non-gay people do not necessarily share the same perceptions of lesbians
or gay men. Accordingly, the Court jumped too uncritically from
lesbian and gay identity to the message that that identity conveyed to the
audience. Although these conflations are not unique to Dale,,2 they
caused a misapplication of Roberts and Hurley and the Court placed this
misattribution into constitutional doctrine.
Finally and most significantly, in modern American society, despite
the gains in acceptance of lesbians and gay men,2 gay identity still
appears so distinctive that it changes the treatment of court users, court
employees, lesbians, and gay men generally. Lesbian or gay identity
colors proceedings and situations even when it is not pertinent. Thus, it
dominates situations in which lesbians and gay men find themselves.
Accordingly, the SOF Report corroborates the Court's premise in Dale
that once some people knew that James Dale was gay, they would never
look at him in the same way again.) 4  Instead of an assistant
scoutmaster, he would become the gay assistant scoutmaster and,
therefore, could alter the Boy Scouts message. This fact also challenges
Justice Stevens's argument that lesbian or gay identity is not
communication. 32 By allowing the First Amendment to shield gay
peoples' exclusion from private organizations, however, the Court
makes it more difficult for gay people to be open and to participate fully
in the diversity of American life.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court prohibited Colorado's attempt
322. E.g., Brewer & Gray, supra note 16, at 49 (quoting response from a gay court
employee: "Questions have been asked of me [regarding] flowers/gardening and other
areas where gay men are stereotyped."); Survey Data, supra note 14, at 10 ("It's the idea
that lesbian relationships cannot be abusive so there must be something wrong with the
individual who is a lesbian, or maybe she's not really a lesbian."); L.A. Bar Report,
supra note 1, at 11-13.
323. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2478 (2000) (Stevens, J..
dissenting) (discussing changing views of homosexuality in the American Psychiatric
and American Psychological Associations, some religions, and various organizations,
schools, and corporations).
324. See supra notes 192 & 293 and accompanying text.
325. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2475 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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to marginalize its lesbian and gay citizens through Amendment 2, which
would have prohibited any governmental entity from protecting lesbians,
gay men, or bisexuals from sexual orientation discrimination. In
holding that the amendment violated the Equal Protection clause, the
Court rejected the argument that the law merely repealed special rights
accorded lesbians and gay men by antidiscrimination statutes:
We find nothing special in the protections Amendment 2 withholds. These are
protections taken for granted by most people either because they already have
them or do not need them; these are protections against exclusion from an
almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary
civic life in a free society.
32 7
Yet even as Romer refused to permit Colorado to exclude lesbians and
gay men from ordinary civic life and push them to society's edges, the
Court's First Amendment doctrine had begun to return lesbians and gay
men to the closet. Forced lesbian and gay invisibility contravenes
Romer's protection of gay people's inclusion into American life.
The closet aids the belief that lesbians and gay men are peripheral to
society because it hides their representation in a variety of positions and
strata. Because many people do not see lesbians or gay men as fully
functioning members of public and private life, they believe gay people
to be one-dimensional"'---separated from the variety of roles in
American society and relegated to certain professions. Gay interior
decorators"z or lesbian gym teachers.. are unremarkable because people
expect them. However, lesbians and gay men must also be visible as
assistant scoutmasters and members of the Baptist Bible Trolley, of
marching bands, fire and police departments, or else people may think
that those lesbian and gay individuals do not exist. Accordingly, GLIB's
attempted message was very important. It is not enough to march in a
326. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
327. Id. at631.
328. For a fuller discussion of the prevalent lesbian or gay schema. see Brow'er.
supra note 3, at 71-74, 77-78, 90-92.
329. Indeed, we so completely expect gay men to fill that job that a non-gay
decorator can be a plot line in a mainstream television situation comedy. Cheers: Norm
Is That You? (television broadcast Dec. 8. 1988). summary available at
http://s9000.furman.edul-ejorgenscheersepisodes/152.html. In this episode. Norm
pretends to be gay in order to meet clients' expectations and obtain a job as an interior
designer. Id.
330. This image is a fixture in high school movie comedies. CLUELESS (Paramount
Pictures 1995); PORKY'S (Twentieth Century Fox 1981); SCARY MOVIE (Dimension
Films 2000).
separate parade or hidden within another group. Gay people must join
the existing institutions of American civic life as equal and visible
members.
A half century ago, people argued publicly that whites' freedom of
association to avoid integration provided significant limits on anti-
discrimination law."' Brown v. Board of Education... foreclosed that
position and people rarely express it openly today. After Brown,
integration worked to break down the belief that African-Americans as a
class were so different that they should be segregated and excluded from
public and commercial life in order to protect others' associative
rights.333 Unfortunately, unlike racial equality today, the struggle for full
social participation by lesbians or gay men must progress against a
contrary legal doctrine.
The doctrinally sanctioned exclusion of lesbians and gay men from
private groups reinforces their perceived isolation from mainstream
society. That isolation subverts lesbian and gay equality, not only within
private organizations, but also in legal regimes explicitly requiring
fairness and respect. As the SOF Report found, the link between lesbian
and gay visibility and negative experiences in the California courts
pervades the experiences of lesbian and gay court users and court
employees. Once lesbian or gay identity is known, it becomes a signal
of difference that triggers worse treatment. When lesbian or gay identity
becomes such an overshadowing characteristic, it marks gay people as
separate and different from non-gay persons. This distinctiveness
supports the closet door that the Court's recent First Amendment
jurisprudence has created. Sadly, the SOF Report illustrates that the
Court may be correct. If all the audience sees is lesbian or gay identity
once they know that fact,"' then the inclusion of lesbians or gay men
may distort a private organization's message.
Accordingly, if gay people are to achieve true equality, they must
331. In re Ass'n for Pres. of Freedom of Choice, Inc., 188 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1959)
(denying corporate charter to group advocating the appropriateness of freedom not to
associate on basis of race or religion.); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE, THE HISTORY
OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY
544-46 (1987); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959) (stating that "integration forces an association on those for
whom it is unpleasant or repugnant").
332. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
333. Peter J. Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights, and the Nature of
Antidiscrimination Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 564, 595-96 (1998).
334. It is like the first time you saw a teenager with a nose ring. All you saw was
the nose ring; all you thought about was what happens when that person gets a cold.
Later, however, as you saw more people with similar ornaments, you started to look past
it toward the individuals behind the nose rings. The audience's perception of lesbian or
gay identity is the key, which is why Hurlev is correct and Dale is not.
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appear more often in a wider variety of societal roles so that they shake
the distinctiveness that blinds others to the ways in which lesbians and
gay men resemble everyone else.3" Pushing open the closet door is not
always simple or pleasant, but compounding the difficulty is the Court's
recent First Amendment jurisprudence that has given private
associations an additional tool to keep that door shut. Nevertheless,
even legal equality is insufficient unless others see open lesbians or gay
men not as separate and different, but as fellow participants in American
civic life.'-
335. The author is not suggesting that lesbians or gay men should deny their
differences from non-gay people or hide the more flamboyant or outrd aspects of some
gay persons' lives. Some gay commentators do, and have called for restrictions on
public behavior and persons which would reinforce negative perceptions of gay people,
MARSHALL KIRK & HuNTER MADSEN, AFER THE BALL 279, 307-12 (19891, and for a
public relations campaign aimed at showing how mainstream gay people are. Id. at 197-
245. The position of this Article is that gay people should select the mechanisms of
advocacy, including images, which are best suited to achieving change.
336. ROGER KAHN, THE Boys OF SUMMER xvii (1971). When spectators of the
1950s applauded Jackie Robinson, they may not have known they were making a racial
statement because "for an instant [they] had accepted Robinson simply as a hometown
ballplayer." Id. However, "[t]o disregard color, even for an instant, is to step away from
the old prejudices, the old hatred. That is not a path on which many double back." hi
628
